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ABSTRACT 
This Article critically examines the legal nature of credit default 
swaps. Functionally a form of credit default insurance, CDSs are 
however commonly characterized as largely unregulated financial 
derivatives, and were widely blamed for exacerbating the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09 and contributing to the European debt 
crisis starting in 2010.  This Article demonstrates that the 
classification of CDSs as derivatives is due to a misapplication of 
insurance law principles and a glaring misreading of relevant 
legislation.  Furthermore, CDSs are structurally and economically 
not swaps, which raises suspicions of deliberate evasion of the law 
by classifying them as swaps.  Given the widespread confusion 
surrounding CDSs, this Article examines the history of the legal 
concept of swaps and demonstrates that the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association developed them in order to exploit 
regulatory exemptions, which were later extended to an increasing 
range of deregulated transactions.  Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act 
reforms, which seek to control the excesses of financial innovation, 
paradoxically consolidate the regime of largely unregulated swaps.  
Ongoing legal and policy issues are highlighted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Credit default swaps (“CDSs”) have been subject to heated debates.  
The opacity of piled-up risks due to CDSs and securitization is seen as 
one cause of the banking crisis of 2007-09,1 and CDS speculation is 
blamed for exacerbating the European sovereign debt crisis that started 
in 2010.2  Apart from igniting regulatory debates, these crises revealed a 
legal problem: how should these contracts be legally classified and 
regulated?3 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 8–10, 50–51, 140–46, 188–95, 200–02, 243–44, 348–51, 376–79 (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter 
FCIC REPORT].  But see id. at 447 (dissenting statement). 
 2. See, e.g., James Rickards, How Markets Attacked the Greek Piñata, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7168fc6-1740-11df-94f6-00144feab49a 
.html; Wolfgang Münchau, Time to Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b56f5b2-24a3-11df-8be0-00144feab49a 
.html. 
 3. See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should 
Like Things Be Treated Alike?, 15 CONN. INS. L. J. 241 (2008) (arguing that CDSs are 
functionally similar to insurance); M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not 
“Insurance”, 16 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Henderson, Credit Derivatives 
Are Not “Insurance”] (disagreeing with Kimball-Stanley); Oskari Juurikkala, Credit 
Default Swaps and Insurance: Against the Potts Opinion, 26 J. INT’L BANKING L. & 
REG. 128 (2011) [hereinafter Juurikkala, Potts Opinion] (arguing that at least some 
CDSs may be insurance contracts). 
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In terms of legal categories, there are two fundamental views of 
CDSs.  One is the derivatives-based understanding that CDSs are 
essentially options or swaps. 4   This view tends to be skeptical of 
regulation, highlighting the benefits of CDSs and the disadvantages of 
insurance law and favoring self-governance or, at most, central 
counterparty clearing of CDSs.5  The opposing view is the insurance-
based understanding of CDSs, which often coincides with arguments in 
favor of regulation.6 
The current legal and regulatory environment is a puzzling mixture 
of both of these views.  On the one hand, CDSs are commonly assumed 
to be largely unregulated derivatives, but the legal argument for this 
view is doubtful if not entirely mistaken.7  On the other hand, post-crisis 
reforms, such as the Dodd-Frank Act,8 mostly reflect the derivatives-
based view, but at the same time, U.S. state legislators sought to regulate 
CDSs as insurance 9  while similar proposals were mooted at federal 
level. 10   Moreover, the new European sovereign CDS short-selling 
prohibition, adopted in 2012, “reflects an insurance-based understanding 
of credit default swaps.”11 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. For representative views, see Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the 
Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167 (2007); Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? 
Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 407, 419–21 (2010); 
Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance”, supra note 3. 
 5. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 22–
46, 56–59; Shadab, supra note 4, at 435–41, 452–62. 
 6. See Benjamin B. Saunders, Should Credit Default Swap Issuers Be Subject to 
Prudential Regulation?, 10 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 427 (2010) (advocating reserves 
regulation for CDSs sellers); Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 248–49 (2008); 
Juurikkala, Potts Opinion, supra note 3 (finding flaws in the legal arguments for the 
derivatives-based understanding).  This view has also been adopted by U.S. insurance 
regulators recently. See infra Part II.H.3–4.  On reserves regulation, see, for example, 
PETER D. SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 68–69 
(2000) (explaining the prudential regulation of insurance companies).  On the insurable 
interest doctrine, see infra Part II.E.1. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see infra Part III.C. 
 9. See infra Part II.H.4. 
 10. See infra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 11. Oskari Juurikkala, Credit Default Swaps and the EU Short Selling Regulation: 
A Critical Analysis, 9 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 307, 309 (2012) [hereinafter 
Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation]; see also Regulation on Short Selling and 
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Earlier studies have incompletely addressed the matter, but this 
Article provides the first in-depth analysis of the issues concerning the 
legal characterization of CDSs.12  The Article is structured as follows.  
Part I presents an overview of CDSs, explaining their mechanics and 
uses, summarizing their benefits and risks, and discussing how the 
current legal environment has given rise to both uncertainty and major 
misunderstandings. 
Part II investigates the relationship between insurance law and 
CDSs.  It summarizes the consequences of insurance regulation, 
discusses the different ways of demarcating insurance law, and 
scrutinizes the arguments that CDSs are not insurance.  In addition to 
correcting misinterpretations of insurance law, Part II also sheds light on 
the economic functioning of CDSs.  Finally, this Part analyzes the 
evolution of the views of U.S. state insurance regulators on this matter. 
Part III explores how CDSs came to be considered deregulated 
swap transactions.  It traces the history and evolution of derivatives law 
and pays special attention to the legal and political influences of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an industry 
organization of the derivatives business.13  This Part demonstrates how 
ISDA skillfully obtained exemptions to the regulations and manipulated 
key concepts, such as swaps, in order to widen the space of unregulated 
activities.  Finally, Part III critically examines the Dodd-Frank Act 
reforms, showing that they paradoxically consolidate ISDA’s regime of 
deregulated derivatives. 
                                                                                                                                         
Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (EU) 236/2012, 2012 O.J. (L86/1) (Mar. 14, 
2012). 
 12. The majority of legal papers on CDSs focus on the question of whether CDSs 
should be regulated as insurance or otherwise, addressing the classification problem in 
current law only cursorily. See, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3; Saunders, supra 
note 6 (both favoring insurance regulation); Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not 
“Insurance,” supra note 3; Schwartz, supra note 4 (both opposing insurance 
regulation).  The specific legal question is addressed in Juurikkala, Potts Opinion, supra 
note 3, but only with respect to the Potts opinion.  Earlier studies have also included 
significant errors, for example, regarding the interpretation of New York Insurance 
Law. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Joanne P. Braithwaite, Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: 
Evidence From the Derivatives Markets, 75 MODERN L. REV. 779 (2012) (describing 
ISDA’s contract architecture). 
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I. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: AN OVERVIEW 
A. DESCRIPTION 
The history of CDSs extends to the early 1990s, as J.P. Morgan 
bankers invented the first credit derivatives in 1994.14  The CDS market 
peaked in 2007 at $57.8 trillion in notional value.15 
CDSs might seem complicated, but their basic structure is 
straightforward.  A CDS is a contract between two parties, whereby one 
party (the “protection buyer”) pays periodic fees in return for a promise 
by the other (the “protection seller”) to compensate for the loss of value 
of the reference obligation(s) in case of a credit event.16  The concept of 
“credit event” is defined broadly to include events other than outright 
nonpayment, and the parties can negotiate such events.17 
Economically, CDSs resemble such contracts as credit insurance 
and guaranties. 18   In one sense, because CDSs are two-party 
relationships, they are more like insurance than guaranties, which 
necessarily involve three parties.19  Yet, if and insofar as CDSs can 
legally be bought and sold without being exposed to the credit risk, they 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See Gillian Tett, The Dream Machine: Invention of Credit Derivatives, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7886e2a8-b967-11da-
9d02-0000779e2340.html (tracking the invention and development of credit 
derivatives). 
 15. See, e.g., Shadab, supra note 4, at 432–33.  However, market size is an estimate 
and subject to dispute regarding measurement methodology. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., ERIK BANKS, MORTON GLANTZ & PAUL SIEGEL, CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: TECHNIQUES TO MANAGE CREDIT RISK FOR FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS 7 
(2007) (“In a basic CDS the credit protection buyer pays the credit protection seller an 
up-front or periodic fee in exchange for a compensatory payment that becomes due and 
payable if the reference credit defaults during the life of the contract.”); see also 
EDMUND PARKER, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: DOCUMENTING AND UNDERSTANDING CREDIT 
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 27–30 (2007). 
 17. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347, 
361–62 (2012); PARKER, supra note 16, at 28. 
 18. David Rule, The Credit Derivatives Market: Its Development and Possible 
Implications for Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV. 117, 118 (2001), available at 
http://mng.ibu.edu.ba/assets/userfiles/mng/ 
feb2013/Reading%20Credit%20derivative%20markets.pdf. 
 19. See Robert D. Aicher, Deborah L. Cotton & T.K. Khan, Credit Enhancement: 
Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 BUS. 
LAW. 897, 921 (2004) (comparing guaranties and insurance). 
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differ from insurance and become a form of betting on debtors’ 
default.20 
The CDS market is over-the-counter (“OTC”), meaning that CDS 
contracts are bilaterally negotiated and not publicly traded.21  However, 
most CDSs adopt the standardized Master Agreements of ISDA.22  In 
the case of default, settlement may take place either physically (by 
accepting delivery of the underlying assets and paying par value) or in 
cash (paying the difference between par value and market value after 
default).23 
B. REGULATORY ASSESSMENT 
1. Benefits 
Generally, the key benefits of CDSs derive from an improved 
flexibility for managing certain risks and obtaining efficiency-enhancing 
investment positions. 24   They are more flexible than traditional 
guaranties or credit insurance because they are more easily customized 
to suit particular risk profiles.25 
There are also indirect benefits due to the positive externalities of 
the CDS market.  Given that the CDS market has become more liquid 
and standardized, it has become easier to compare offers, and their 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007) (“[A] credit default swap is a private 
contract in which private parties bet on a debt issuer’s bankruptcy.”). 
 21. For more on OTC derivatives, see, for example, Norman Menachem Feder, 
Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677 (2002); 
ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 151–68 (2000). 
 22. Precise data is hard to find, but Braithwaite provides a range of evidence 
suggesting that “an estimated 90 per cent of all OTC derivatives are governed by the 
standardised documentation” of ISDA. See Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 784.  
Regarding CDSs specifically, Gelpern & Gulati argue that “[i]t is hard to conceive of a 
stronger and more successful trade group in charge of more important contracts than 
ISDA, if success is to be measured by share of the contract market and importance by 
dollar volume”. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 17, at 355–56. 
 23. BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 33; see also Feder, supra note 21, 
at 708–09 (describing cash-settlement and physical settlement in OTC derivatives). 
 24. STEINHERR, supra note 21, at 166–67. 
 25. Rule, supra note 18, at 118. 
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pricing has probably become more efficient.26  Moreover, as CDS prices 
have begun to be publicly quoted, they have become a source of timely 
information on the market’s estimates on default probabilities.27 
2. Risks and Concerns 
However, CDSs have some shortcomings.  First, they involve firm-
level risks, as CDSs may be transacted without fully understanding and 
controlling the risks. 28   For example, selling CDS protection is 
functionally equivalent to selling insurance, which is a highly risky 
industry, and firms might not have a sufficient understanding or 
adequate control procedures.29 
Second, CDSs appear to negatively influence incentives.  On the 
one hand, they can harm borrower-lender relationships by reducing 
screening and monitoring incentives.30  On the other hand, it is feared 
that CDSs misalign incentives in the event of default.31  CDS value is 
determined by credit events so that bondholders possessing CDS 
protection may benefit from pushing distressed debtors into bankruptcy 
(this is called the empty creditor problem).32  This can be socially costly 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. The lack of price transparency in OTC derivatives markets tends to mean that 
dealers exploit less well-informed end users. See STEINHERR, supra note 21, at 157 
(citing evidence that “OTC issuers may charge up to 45% over the theoretical option 
price”). 
 27. See Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap 
Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010) 
(proposing CDS spreads as a substitute for credit ratings). 
 28. Agasha Mugasha, The Secondary Market for Syndicated Loans: Loan Trading, 
Credit Derivatives, and Collateralized Debt Obligations, 19 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 
199, 220 (2004) [hereinafter Mugasha, Syndicated Loans]. 
 29. See id. at 221–23. 
 30. See Rym Ayadi & Patrick Behr, On the Necessity to Regulate Derivatives 
Markets, 10 J. BANKING REG. 179, 187–89 (describing incentive issues associated with 
credit derivatives). 
 31. David McIlroy, The Regulatory Issues Raised by Credit Default Swaps, 11 J. 
BANKING REG. 303, 307–09 (2010) (discussing incentive issues of CDSs in the case of 
default). 
 32. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling 
and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) 
(developing the theory of “empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) ownership”); 
Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor 
Problem, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2617 (2011) (demonstrating formally that credit default 
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given the wider social and economic ramifications of corporate 
restructuring and bankruptcy. 
Third, one motivation for CDSs is regulatory arbitrage, as they 
give “access to credit markets which are otherwise restricted by 
corporate statute or off-limits by regulation.”33  There is evidence that 
much of the CDS market is connected to regulatory arbitrage.34  This is 
problematic when those restrictions are reasonable.  CDSs have enabled 
financial institutions to take on more risks that are highly opaque to both 
investors and regulators, so instead of improving the pricing of credit 
risks, CDSs made it more difficult to correctly locate and price risks.35  
Moreover, CDSs can be used for insider trading.36 
Fourth, credit default swaps may give rise to negative externalities, 
as spreading credit risk more widely has increased systemic risks.37  In 
other words, credit risk transfer may improve risk management in 
individual cases but has exacerbated system-wide instability because 
difficulties in one sector extend to the entire market.38  The opacity of 
the CDS market has also made it possible for huge amounts of risk to be 
concentrated without the notice of other market participants or 
regulators.39  Before the crisis that started in 2007, many commentators 
downplayed the issue,40  but subsequent events—particularly the AIG 
fiasco—have proven otherwise.41 
                                                                                                                                         
insurance reduces the incidence of strategic default, but causes an inefficiently high 
incidence of costly bankruptcy). 
 33. André Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in 
the Unites States and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 151 (2000).  On the 
notion of regulatory arbitrage, see Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs 
of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) [hereinafter Partnoy, 
Regulatory Arbitrage]. 
 34. See Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 186 (describing the principal motivations 
for using credit derivatives). 
 35. See McIlroy, supra note 31, at 305–07 (discussing the opacity and complexity 
created by CDSs). 
 36. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in 
Credit Derivatives 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007); see also Juurikkala, EU Short Selling 
Regulation, supra note 11, at 313–15 (describing regulatory reactions). 
 37. For a detailed study on the notion of systemic risk in financial markets, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN L. J. 193, 200 (2008). 
 38. See Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 189–91. 
 39. See McIlroy, supra note 31, at 309; Shadab, supra note 4, at 444–52 
(discussing overconcentration of CDS exposure). 
 40. See, e.g., Tim Weithers, Credit Derivatives, Macro Risks, and Systemic Risks, 
FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 43 (2007), available at 
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Fifth, unrestricted opportunities for betting on debtors’ default can 
destabilize distressed markets.42  In theory, these opportunities might 
improve market efficiency, but in practice, there is little empirical 
support for this, and many borrowers have suffered from CDS 
speculation.43  In informationally imperfect markets, CDSs may also be 
used to generate destabilizing signals, and regulators have been 
concerned about market manipulation.44 
C. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, AND MYTHS 
Before a detailed analysis of CDSs as either insurance or 
derivatives, it is necessary to place the issues in a bigger picture.  Before 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the legal characterization of CDSs was open to 
debate, and practically no case law clarified the matter.45  In two U.S. 
cases, the courts pronounced obiter dicta on the nature of CDSs, one 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq407_weithers.pdf (discussing systemic risk 
and arguing that risk dispersion has reduced systemic risk in banking, although 
admitting that risk concentration in hedge funds could be a problem). 
 41. On the AIG case, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 943 (2009), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-
3Sjostrom.pdf; FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 50, 139–42, 200–02, 243–44, 265–74, 
344–52; Shadab, supra note 4, at 447–52. 
 42. See Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, at 325–28 
(discussing empirical evidence). 
 43. Id. at 325–26; see also Adam B. Ashcraft & João A.C. Santos, Has the CDS 
Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt? 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 514 (2009) 
(finding insignificant benefits overall, and major adverse effects on risky and 
informationally opaque borrowers). 
 44. Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, at 328; see also 
Testimony Concerning Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding 
Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) 
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
2008/ts092308cc.htm (explaining an enforcement investigation and referring to “the 
significant opportunities that exist for manipulation in the $58 trillion CDS market, 
which is completely lacking in transparency and completely unregulated”). 
 45. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173 (citing data on the scarcity of CDS 
litigation); Aicher, Cotton & Khan, supra note 19, at 956 (noting the lack of decided 
CDS cases). 
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likening them to insurance46 and the other differentiating them,47 but 
neither decision ruled on the classification issue.48 
The Potts opinion of 1997 supports the derivatives-based view, 
arguing that CDSs were not insurance in English law.49  That view is 
carefully examined later, 50  but even supposing it to be correct in 
arguendo, the opinion does not explain what CDSs are.  As explained in 
this section, the matter continues to remain open in many respects. 
1. CDSs as Securities: Early Opinions and Contrary Legislation 
According to one U.S. attorney, “[u]ntil December 2000, the 
prevailing opinion among practitioners was that CDSs were securities 
under the Securities Act” because “a CDS was viewed as a put on an 
evidence of indebtedness.” 51   That view is doubtful, because 
economically, a CDS is definitely not a put on an evidence of 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. See Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance et al., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 
300 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A credit default swap is an arrangement similar to an insurance 
contract.  The buyer of protection . . . pays a periodic fee, like an insurance premium, to 
the seller of protection . . . , in exchange for compensation in the event that the insured 
security experiences default.”). 
 47. See AON Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“CDS agreements are thus significantly different from insurance contracts.”).  
Interestingly, the court cited an ISDA amicus curiae brief stating that CDSs “do not, 
and are not meant to, indemnify the buyer of protection against loss.  Rather, CDS 
contracts allow parties to ‘hedge’ risk by buying and selling risks at different prices and 
with varying degrees of correlation.” Id.  However, this generic description evades the 
question of how CDSs are structured and does not differentiate them from insurance.  In 
fact, the court’s own definition of CDSs was plainer: “[c]redit default swaps are a 
method by which one party (the protection buyer) transfers risk to another party (the 
protection seller).” Id. 
 48. Like most CDS cases, these two cases were concerned with whether a credit 
event had occurred within the meaning of the terms of the contract. See id.; see also 
Merrill Lynch Int’l, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 298. 
 49. See ROBIN POTTS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: OPINION (1997) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter POTTS OPINION]; see, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 246–47. 
 50. Infra Part II.C. 
 51. Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984; see also Adam W. Glass, CFMA Brings Legal 
Certainty, but Additional Liability for Credit Derivatives: Part One, LINKLATERS, 1 
(2001), available at http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/us/cfmaapril2001.pdf. 
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indebtedness. 52   Moreover, many CDSs were probably transacted as 
unregulated swaps rather than securities.53 
In 2000 the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”),54 
the first piece of U.S. legislation explicitly addressing CDSs, removed 
the potential of characterizing CDSs as securities by determining that 
swap agreements, including CDSs, are not securities under the federal 
securities laws.55   The act also excluded the regulation of CDSs as 
commodity derivatives, treating them as exempted swap transactions.56  
However, CFMA did not exclude the application of insurance laws to 
transactions that resemble insurance.57 
2. Letter of Credit, Guaranty, or Financial Guaranty Insurance? 
Another view, advanced in light of English law, is that CDSs are 
analogous to a letter of credit or a third-party guarantee.58  However, 
even if some similarities exist, the classification is inaccurate because 
letters of credit and third-party guarantees are fundamentally three-party 
relationships whereas CDSs are structured as two-party relationships 
                                                                                                                                         
 52. Evidence of indebtedness could influence CDS prices, but payments under 
CDSs are determined by specific credit events. 
 53. There is no hard data on the early development of the market for CDSs, and 
moreover, “[t]here is substantial uncertainty surrounding the definition of ‘security.’” 
Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 421, 495 n.26 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation]. 
 54. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 
11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); see also infra Part III.B.5. 
 55. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984–85; see also Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The 
Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3099 (2008). 
 56. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 986; see also Wynkoop, supra note 55, at 3100. 
 57. See Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the US Economy: 
Testimony to the H. Comm. On Agric. 110th Cong. 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_ins/sp0811201.pdf (testimony of Eric Dinallo, 
N.Y. Superintendent of Ins.) (explaining the effects of CFMA and highlighting that the 
insurance issue was left open); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173 (noting that “the 
state of insurance regulation remains unsettled in many places”). 
 58. See Schuyler K. Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives: To What Effect 
and for Whose Benefit? Part 6, 8 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 480, 481–82 (2009) 
[hereinafter Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives]. 
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whereby payment depends on external and flexibly negotiable credit 
events.59 
According to one representative of U.S. insurance legislators, CDSs 
are really a form of financial guaranty insurance. 60   The evolving 
attitude of insurance regulators is examined later, but it should be noted 
that financial guaranty insurance is a novel and peculiar form of 
insurance that is normally tripartite, like a letter of credit written by an 
insurer.61  Therefore, it seems inaccurate to treat all CDSs as financial 
guaranty insurance, although statutory definitions of financial guaranty 
insurance are broad,62 so some CDSs might be caught. 
3. New York Insurance Law: The Misquoted Article 69 
While there is uncertainty, there are also myths.  One of them is the 
common, but erroneous, belief that the possibility of classifying CDSs 
as insurance was excluded in New York State in 2004, when Article 69 
of the New York Insurance Law (dealing with financial guaranty 
insurance) was amended to define some aspects of CDSs.63  Several 
commentators claimed that the amendment definitively excluded CDSs 
from insurance regulation, citing § 6901(j-1): “the making of [a] credit 
default swap does not constitute the doing of an insurance business.”64  
Thus, Shadab writes that New York “in 2004 codified that position [that 
CDSs do not qualify as insurance contracts] in Article 69 of the New 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text; see also Aicher, Cotton & 
Khan, supra note 19, at 899–900 (describing letters of credit), 910–11 (guaranties), 
954–56 (CDSs).  Letter of credit and guaranties differ in that the first is subject to the 
“independence principle” whereas the latter are strictly secondary obligations. Id. at 
902.  There is long-standing confusion regarding the legal differentiation of different 
forms of credit enhancement. Id. at 898–99.  The strictly two-party nature of CDSs is 
implicitly acknowledged by Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives, supra note 
58, at 482 (“It is a fundamental cornerstone of the CDS market that performance is 
based on its contractual terms, objectively applied . . . .”). 
 60. See Hearing to Review Derivatives Legislation Before the H. Comm. On Agric., 
111th Cong. 147–48 (2009), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/ 
republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/testimony/111/111-1.pdf (statement of the Hon. 
Joseph D. Morelle, N.Y. Assemb. And Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ins., testifying 
on behalf of the Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators). 
 61. See Aicher, Cotton & Khan, supra note 19, at 930–32. 
 62. See id. at 934–35. 
 63. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901 (McKinney 2014). 
 64. See, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 252 (citing exactly this). 
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York Insurance Law.”65  Schwartz states that “New York updated its 
insurance laws to exclude CDS in 2004”66 and that this “permanently 
quelled the worries of those who feared insurance treatment for CDS.”67  
Kimball-Stanley comments: “The statute is hardly a convincing analysis 
of the legal issues involved in such a statement; but it is effective 
nonetheless.”68 
However, this is all a misunderstanding because the statutory 
sentence has been taken out of context.  The original paragraph defines 
the meaning of CDSs for the purposes of New York Insurance Law and 
adds a caveat to highlight that the definition only applies on the 
condition that the agreement is not deemed to be an insurance contract. 
“Credit default swap” means an agreement referencing the credit 
derivative definitions published from time to time by the 
International Swap and Derivatives Association, Inc. or otherwise 
acceptable to the superintendent, pursuant to which a party agrees to 
compensate another party in the event of a payment default by, 
insolvency of, or other adverse credit event in respect of, an issuer of 
a specified security or other obligation; provided that such 
agreement does not constitute an insurance contract and the making 
of such credit default swap does not constitute the doing of an 
insurance business.69 
The original purpose of the last sentence is to warn that the 
application of insurance law to CDSs had not been settled.  Insurance 
Superintendent Eric R. Dinallo emphasized this interpretation and 
clarified the meaning of the paragraph in September 2008: “[t]hus, 
provided that the making of the CDS itself ‘does not constitute the doing 
of an insurance business,’ Insurance Law . . . permits FGIs [financial 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. Shadab, supra note 4, at 429. 
 66. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173; see also Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 988 
(asserting that “[t]his [that CDSs have not been subject to insurance regulations] was 
made crystal clear by the state of New York in 2004 when it amended its insurance 
laws specifically to exclude CDSs from coverage.)” 
 67. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 183; see also Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing 
Financial Regulation, 90 B. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) (“In New York . . . most of 
AIGFP’s [credit default] swaps were expressly excluded from insurance regulation.”). 
 68. Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 252. 
 69. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added). 
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guaranty insurance companies] to issue insurance policies that guarantee 
payments by transformers or other parties pursuant to such a CDS.”70 
In other words, Article 69 states that insurers could sell financial 
guaranty insurance to guarantee non-insurance CDSs, implying that 
some CDSs could be insurance and their differentiation must be 
determined independently. 
4. Recent Reforms and the Ongoing Relevance of the Insurance 
Question 
In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act somewhat clarified the legal status 
of CDSs by excluding their characterization as insurance and imposing 
mandatory clearing for most CDSs.71  However, the solution is puzzling, 
as it depends on a paradoxical concept of “swap” that departs from 
financial definitions, which may cover many insurance contracts.72  The 
insurance question has ongoing policy relevance because Dodd-Frank 
fails to address many regulatory concerns and raises new ones.73 
The insurance issue is, thus, more immediately relevant in Europe, 
including the UK due to its dominant market in credit derivatives.74  In 
Europe, the common assumption that CDSs are derivatives has no clear 
legal foundation.  For example, the new regulation imposing mandatory 
clearing for many OTC derivatives (commonly known as the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”)75 is commonly assumed to 
cover CDSs, but in fact, it makes no explicit reference to CDSs.  
                                                                                                                                         
 70. Circular Letter No. 19, Re: “Best Practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers 
from Eric R. Dinallo, Superintendent of the N.Y. Ins. Dep’t, to all authorized financial 
guaranty insurers (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19.htm; see also Sherri Venokur, 
Matthew Magidson & Adam M. Singer, Comparing Credit Default Swaps to Insurance 
Contracts: Did the New York State Insurance Department Get It Right?, 28 No. 11 
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REPORT 1, 4 (2008) (“[I]f the CDS itself does not constitute 
an insurance contract or the doing of an insurance business, then an FGI is permitted to 
issue an insurance policy that guarantees payments by a transformer or other party 
pursuant to such CDS.”). 
 71. See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion. 
 72. See infra notes 384–78 and accompanying text. 
 73. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 74. PARKER, supra note 16, at 13. 
 75. Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC 
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (July 
4, 2012). 
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Instead, it defines “derivative” or “derivative contract” by referring back 
to a list of instruments attached to the MiFID Directive.76  This list does 
not mention CDSs either, only generically referring to “[d]erivative 
instruments for the transfer of credit risk.”77  If this is the legal basis for 
arguing that CDSs are not insurance, it is utterly inadequate because 
invoking it as a statutory classification would therefore be circular.  
Thus, the non-specific expression in MiFID does not provide 
demarcation criteria but simply presupposes the prior legal classification 
as a derivative. 
II. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
Many specialists acknowledge that CDSs seem like insurance.78  
This Part outlines the implications of insurance regulation and concludes 
that CDSs are legally insurance because CDSs fall within standard 
definitions and tests and contrary arguments seem to be based on 
misunderstandings of insurance law.  The development of the thinking 
of U.S. insurance regulators is also analyzed. 
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSURANCE REGULATION 
Insurance regulation carries major practical significance.  First, 
selling insurance without a proper license may render protection sellers 
civilly and criminally liable.79  The rules vary between jurisdictions, but 
generally, “if credit default swaps are deemed insurance by an insurance 
regulator, a protection seller could be subject to criminal prosecution, 
substantial fines, and forfeiture of its corporate charter unless it 
                                                                                                                                         
 76. Id. at Art. 2(5). 
 77. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. (L145) 1, Annex 1, Section C(8) (Apr. 21, 
2004). 
 78. See, e.g., MARK J.P. ANSON, CREDIT DERIVATIVES 44 (1999) (“This type of 
swap may be properly classified as credit insurance.”); FRANK SKINNER, PRICING AND 
HEDGING INTEREST AND CREDIT RISK SENSITIVE INSTRUMENTS 280 (2005) (“Credit 
default swaps . . . are actually default insurance.”). 
 79. David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default Swaps 
Insurance?, 3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7, 8 (2001). 
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maintained the requisite licenses.”80  The protection buyer may also be 
able to recover the money paid or any loss sustained.81 
Second, authorization to sell insurance implies a range of 
regulatory burdens, including loss reserves, capitalization, compulsory 
disclosures, and investment restrictions.82  Therefore, firms may wish to 
avoid the application of insurance law.83  Third, insurance law in most 
jurisdictions limits the freedom of protection buyers by imposing, the 
requirement of insurable interest, which limits speculative risk-taking.84  
Fourth, insurance contracts are normally subject to the principle of 
utmost good faith, which requires both parties to disclose all information 
that would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer. 85   The 
application of this principle varies greatly among jurisdictions and types 
of insurance.86  In the U.S. in particular, there is “a substantial consumer 
protection element of the law governing insurance.”87 
                                                                                                                                         
 80. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (McKinney 2014).  In the U.K., the 
regime under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is complicated because a 
person may be authorized by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), but if the 
permission does not extend to insurance, the breach is only subject to FSA sanctions, 
including criminal penalties. See JOANNA BENJAMIN, FINANCIAL LAW ¶¶ 10.17–10.20 
(2007). 
 81. See MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 60 (2007) (describing U.K. rules); BENJAMIN, supra note 80, 
at 10.18. 
 82. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 81, at 61–65 (describing a range of duties falling 
upon insurers in the UK); ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 112–
23 (3rd ed. 2001) (describing statutory controls in the U.S.).  Taxation and accounting 
rules are also specific to insurance. See, e.g., HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, GENERAL 
INSURANCE MANUAL (2011), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/gimanual. 
 83. See Jan Hellner, The Scope of Insurance Regulation: What Is Insurance for 
Purposes of Regulation?, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 494, 494 (1963). 
 84. See infra Part II.E. 
 85. See CLARKE, supra note 81, at 98–116 (discussing this principle critically). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: 
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 431–32 (2005). 
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B. DEMARCATING INSURANCE 
1. Legal Definitions 
Definitions cannot definitively demarcate the scope of insurance 
law, but are necessary as a matter of first impression.  Although there is 
some variation among the conventional legal definitions of insurance, it 
is argued in what follows that the definitions agree on the fundamentals, 
and those fundamental elements embrace all or many CDSs.88 
In the U.S., Black’s Law Dictionary defines insurance as a 
“contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify 
another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability 
arising from the occurrence of some specified contingency.”89  In the 
U.K., some statutes deal with insurance law, but the demarcation of 
insurance continues to be determined by common law and the 
regulators’ interpretation thereof.90  In the landmark case of Prudential 
Insurance Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Judge Channell 
describes insurance: 
A contract of insurance, then, must be a contract for the payment of 
a sum of money, or for some corresponding benefit such as the 
rebuilding of a house or the repairing of a ship, to become due on the 
happening of an event, which event must have some [degree] of 
uncertainty about it and must be of a character more or less adverse 
to the interest of the person effecting the insurance.91 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. This discussion is limited to U.S. and English law because they are the leading 
jurisdictions for CDS markets.  The demarcation of insurance law does not appear 
fundamentally different in other jurisdictions although there are important differences 
in the details of insurance regulation. 
 89. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009). New York Insurance Law 
provides a longer but essentially similar definition. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a) 
(McKinney 2014). 
 90. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK: PERIMETER GUIDANCE MANUAL 
(PERG) ¶¶ 6.3.2, 6.5.2 (2012), available at 
http://media.fsahandbook.info/pdf/PERG.pdf [hereinafter FSA, PERG]; CLARKE, supra 
note 81, at 349. 
 91. Prudential Ins. Co. v IRC, [1904] 2 KB 658, 663.  According to the FSA, 
Prudential is the best statement of the common law. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 
6.5.1. 
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There are three fundamental elements of insurance contracts: 
payment, uncertainty, and adverseness (interest).92  It is evident that the 
broad definitions would include CDSs, at least in some cases, as many 
commentators acknowledge that a “CDS certainly appears to fall within 
this definition [in Black’s Law Dictionary].”93  Even Schwartz, who is 
critical of insurance law, concludes that “on their face, these [New 
York] statutes define insurance contracts such that CDS[s]—at least 
those with exogenous credit events—could be subject to insurance 
regulation.” 94   Attempts to downplay the issue refer to non-legal 
definitions of insurance, such as those highlighting risk pooling,95 which 
is important for insurance economics but not a legal criterion for 
demarcating insurance law, so these arguments lack legal merit. 
2. Borderline Cases 
Definitions are not the final word, though.  Demarcations must be 
determined by courts and regulators, which are skeptical of generic 
definitions “because definitions tend sometimes to obscure and 
occasionally to exclude that which ought to be included.” 96   Even 
statutes that provide a definition should not be blindly relied upon, as 
“the approach through formal definition leads to innumerable difficulties 
and, if taken seriously, unfortunate results.”97 
There is no simple way to determine borderline cases.98  Courts at 
common law have developed a range of criteria based on the 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. THE LAW COMMISSION & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE 
INTEREST, 2008, Issue Paper 4, ¶ 7.19 [hereinafter LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE 
INTEREST], available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/ 
download_file/view/203/107.  For similar definitions, see, for example, E.R. HARDY 
IVAMY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 3–4 (6th ed. 1993); NICHOLAS LEIGH-
JONES, JOHN BIRDS & DAVID OWEN, MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW ¶ 1-1 (10th 
ed. 2003). 
 93. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 987. 
 94. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 181. 
 95. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 16. 
 96. Department of Trade and Industry v St. Christopher Motorists Association 
(1974) 1 All ER 395, at 396–97; see also CLARKE, supra note 81, at 347–52 (discussing 
the limits of definitions). 
 97. Hellner, supra note 83, at 495. 
 98. Id. at 500–04 (discussing various tests and their limits). 
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peculiarities of new cases.99  However, the criteria seem to add little to 
the present discussion, as many of them are trivial and easily fulfilled in 
CDSs.100  Only two criteria raise questions for CDSs.  One, that “the 
insured event must be one that is adverse to the policyholder,”101 is only 
relevant for some (so-called uncovered or “naked”) CDSs.102 
Another potentially relevant criterion is the “major or primary 
purpose test” developed in some U.S. cases, according to which, “where 
the major purpose of a contract is other than to indemnify the promise, 
there is no insurance.”103  However, the validity of this test is doubtful, 
as it is contradicted by some cases and “cannot prevail as a general 
test.”104  U.K. regulators expressly abolished the test: “The contract must 
be characterised as a whole and not according to its ‘dominant purpose’ 
or the relative weight of its ‘insurance content’.”105  In any case, this test 
might not matter for CDSs because the only purpose of CDSs is 
precisely to indemnify, e.g., to recover the loss of reference asset value 
due to default or another credit event.106 
Some argue that “attempts at evasion of insurance regulation 
should not be tolerated,” giving rise to a kind of positive presumption in 
favor of regulation. 107   This is relevant to CDSs because the very 
language of “swaps” may be interpreted as a camouflage.108 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 81, at 350 (describing features highlighted by 
English courts); Hellner, supra note 83, 500–12 (discussing U.S. cases). 
 100. For example, CLARKE, supra note 81, at 350, lists the following criteria: the 
provision of insurance must be a business of a certain degree of regularity (even if 
insurance is just one part of its business); the insurer’s promise to pay must be “in 
money or in kind”; “the alleged insurer must be legally (e.g., contractually) bound to 
pay the money or provide the benefit in kind . . . and the beneficiary must have a legally 
enforceable right to receive it”; and “the benefit is due only if a specified insured event 
occurs. Moreover, at the time of contracting, it must be uncertain whether the specified 
event will occur.” 
 101. Id. 
 102. See infra Part II.E.2. 
 103. Hellner, supra note 83, at 502. 
 104. Id. 
 105. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(3) (citing Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. Ltd [1997] Ch. 173 (C.A.)); see also id. ¶ 6.6.7.(2). 
 106. This will be discussed later in detail. See infra Part II.F.1.  The point of the 
major purpose test is not to scrutinize the motivations of the insured party (which in 
CDS transactions may be speculative), but to distinguish contracts which have only a 
marginal insurance element. See Hellner, supra note 83, at 502–03. 
 107. See Hellner, supra note 83, at 503–04 (discussing this argument). 
 108. See infra Part II.D.3. 
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3. UK Financial Services Authority Guidelines 
In the U.K., the difficulty of delineating the boundaries of 
insurance law has prompted the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”)—
which supervised both securities and insurance industries—to provide 
further guidance. 109   This guidance is not conclusive and does not 
explicitly discuss CDSs, but it corroborates the impression that English 
insurance law covers CDSs. 
First, the FSA lists transactions that are unlikely to be regarded as 
insurance.  These include contracts that appear to be “pre-payment for 
services to be rendered in response to a future contingency”;110 contracts 
of “periodic maintenance of goods or facilities”;111 and contracts under 
which “the provider stands ready to provide services on the occurrence 
of a future contingency, on condition that the services actually provided 
are paid for by the recipient at a commercial rate.”112  CDSs resemble 
none of these transactions. 
Second, in terms of affirmative criteria, the FSA highlights the 
“assumption of risk” by the insurer as “an important descriptive feature 
of all contracts of insurance.”113  For the FSA, the assumption of risk has 
the same meaning as the “transfer of risk.”114  This is precisely the 
fundamental element of CDSs.  It does not matter if the provider “trades 
without any risk,”115 as may be the case with an investment bank acting 
as a CDS intermediary. 
With respect to borderline cases, the FSA notes that insurance law 
is more likely to apply “if the amount payable by the recipient under the 
contract is calculated by reference to either or both of the probability of 
occurrence or likely severity of the uncertain event.”116  This is the case 
for CDSs, at least in practice, because CDS premiums or spreads reflect 
                                                                                                                                         
 109. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACTS OF 
INSURANCE (2004) [hereinafter FSA, INSURANCE], available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps04_19.pdf; this document updated the guidance in 
FSA, PERG, supra note 90, at Chapter 6. 
 110. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.6.3. 
 111. Id. ¶ 6.6.4. 
 112. Id. ¶ 6.6.5. 
 113. Id. ¶ 6.6.2. 
 114. Id. ¶ 6.6.2(1). 
 115. Id. ¶ 6.6.2(3). 
 116. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(1). 
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expectations of probability and severity of credit events.117  Also, the 
FSA states that a contract is less likely to be insurance “if it requires the 
provider to assume a speculative risk (i.e. a risk carrying the possibility 
of either profit or loss) rather than a pure risk (i.e. a risk of loss 
only).”118  CDSs transfer the risk of loss only because credit events are 
always downside risks in terms of reference asset value.119 
In the FSA guidance, the only factor against insurance 
characterization of CDSs is that a contract is more likely to be insurance 
if it “is described as insurance and contains terms that are consistent 
with its classification as a contract of insurance, for example, obligations 
of the utmost good faith.”120  However, this is not the case for CDSs.  
The guidance goes on to note that what matters is the substance, and the 
contract “does not cease to be a contract of insurance simply because the 
terms included are not usual insurance terms.” 121   The question is 
asymmetric: 
Although there are good reasons for submitting anything that is 
frankly called insurance to insurance regulation, since the public 
might otherwise be misled, the test is clearly unsuitable when 
applied to business which is not called insurance for then an easy 
way to avoid the burden of regulation would be to use another 
name.122 
Therefore, the use of insurance language renders insurance 
characterization more likely, but the avoidance of such language does 
not make insurance characterization unlikely. 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 34 (“The premium is a function of 
various factors, including time to maturity, probability of reference credit default, 
expected recovery rate given default[,]” etc.). 
 118. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.6.8(2). 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(3). 
 121. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(4). 
 122. Hellner, supra note 83, at 500. 
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C. POTTS OPINION: THE LEADING ARGUMENT THAT CDSS ARE NOT 
INSURANCE 
1. The Potts Opinion and Its Importance 
The argument for insurance recharacterization seems strong, but 
there is a persistent belief that CDSs are not insurance.  This belief goes 
back to a legal opinion on credit derivatives penned in 1997 by Robin 
Potts QC in London for ISDA.123  After examining the principles, Potts 
concluded: 
I think that credit default options [sic] plainly differ from contracts 
of insurance in the following critical respects:- 
(a) the payment obligation is not conditional on the payee’s 
sustaining a loss or having a risk of loss; [and] 
(b) the contract is thus not one which seeks to protect an insurable 
interest on the part of the payee. His rights do not depend on the 
existence of any insurable interest.124 
Potts went on to admit that “the economic effect of certain credit 
derivatives can be similar to” insurance but “is not the test to be applied 
to the characterisation of the transaction.” 125   Instead, the question 
depends on the intended rights and obligations specified in the 
contract.126  Potts also recommended that the contract include a clause 
insisting that the parties wish the obligations to exist, regardless of 
whether the protection buyer suffers or is exposed to a loss, so that the 
transaction would not be an insurance contract.127 
Before critically analyzing Potts’ reasoning, it is worth noting its 
importance.  In the words of an anonymous ISDA representative, “there 
would have been no market at all” in CDSs in the absence of the Potts 
opinion. 128   ISDA has repeated the core of Potts’s argument on 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. See POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 1. 
 124. Id. ¶ 5.  
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. ¶ 6. 
 128. Isabelle Huault & Hélène Rainelli-Le Montagner, Market Shaping as an 
Answer to Ambiguities: The Case of Credit Derivatives, 30 ORG. STUD. 549, 560 
(2009). 
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numerous occasions.129  The rhetorical weight of the Potts opinion has 
been so impressive that in a 2006 letter to the English Law Commission, 
ISDA Senior Policy Director Richard Metcalfe invoked the authority of 
the “widespread acceptance of the so-called ‘Potts opinion,’” which had 
come to represent “current market consensus.”130 
In reality, though, that widespread acceptance was driven by a 
group of London-based banking lawyers basically repeating the Potts 
opinion in a range of publications.131  For example, a group of Allen & 
Overy solicitors—connected with the Potts opinion itself—made the 
same argument in 1997.132  In 2001, Norton Rose lawyers advanced 
essentially the same argument, 133  and in 2003, ISDA documentation 
expert Paul Harding referred to the Potts opinion as definitive. 134  
Likewise, Joanna Benjamin in 2007 wrote—while expressing doubts 
about the accuracy of Potts’ analysis—that “given the degree of 
authority commanded by the Potts opinion in the financial markets, and 
given also the importance of commercial expectations in characterising 
financial contracts, the opinion may now be regarded as conclusive.”135 
2. Mixed Reception 
Determining whether the Potts opinion is conclusive involves 
complex legal issues that the following sections examine in detail, but 
                                                                                                                                         
 129. See, e.g., Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Exec. Dir. & CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N. 
Csiszar, President, NAIC & Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Ins. Mkts., NAIC 
(Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/NAICltr022304.pdf 
(arguing that weather derivatives are not insurance). 
 130. Letter from Richard Metcalfe, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, to the Law 
Comm’n (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.isda.org (responding to Insurance 
Contract Law: A Joint Scoping Paper). 
 131. See, e.g., Mugasha, Syndicated Loans, supra note 28, at 222–23 (summarizing 
arguments similar to the Potts opinion). 
 132. David Benton, Patrick Devine & Philip Jarvis, Credit Derivatives Are Not 
Insurance Products, 16 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 29, 30–31 (1997).  Benton was one of the 
two Allen & Overy Instructing Solicitors acting for ISDA in requesting the Potts 
opinion. See Allen & Overy, Instructions to Counsel, at 10 (May 19, 1997) [hereinafter 
Potts Instructions] (on file with author). 
 133. Maria Ross & Charlotte Davies, Credit Derivatives and Insurance – a World 
Apart?, in LLOYDS, ARTWORK 2 (2001). 
 134. PAUL C. HARDING, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 18–19 (2004). 
 135. BENJAMIN, supra note 80, at 142 n.426. 
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generally, the assessments of Harding and Benjamin seem hasty at best.  
The Potts opinion is famous, but legally, it is only a private opinion.  Its 
acceptance by the market—that is, a financial market keen to free itself 
from the shackles of regulation—is hardly surprising, and certainly does 
not render it conclusive. 
Moreover, the acceptance of the Potts opinion has been hugely 
exaggerated.  In fact, already in 1998, Professor Hudson wrote that 
credit derivatives basically provide “a form of insurance policy for the 
buyer”136 and that they imply “a number of areas of potential liability 
where dealers are, in terms, providing insurance to their clients.”137  In 
2000, John Jakeways advanced a more nuanced position on the 
insurance question.  In his view, the answer should depend on the 
specific terms of each contract, and, while many credit derivatives might 
escape insurance law, nothing certain could be said.138  Ali and de Vries 
Robbé, in 2005, likewise highlighted the continuing legal risk that credit 
derivatives might be recharacterized as insurance.139  Finally, Benjamin 
Saunders, in 2010, argued that at least some CDSs—”for example a 
bank entering a CDS to protect against borrower default”—are “a form 
of indemnity insurance.”140 
Just as academic opinion has diverged from Potts on many points, 
Potts’ reception by regulators has been equally mixed.  In the U.K., the 
FSA explicitly commented on the Potts opinion in 2002, arguing that the 
Potts opinion should not be relied upon.141  The same suspicion was 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. Alastair Hudson, Seller Liability for Credit Derivatives 5 (July 1998), available 
at http://www.alastairhudson.com/financelaw/sellerliabilitycreditderivs.pdf. 
 137. Id. at 14. 
 138. John Jakeways, The Legal Nature of Credit Derivatives, in CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: LAW, REGULATION AND ACCOUNTING ISSUES 47, 51–53 (Alastair Hudson 
ed., 1999).  It seems correct that the issue depends on the specific terms of the contract.  
However, Jakeways also suggested that the basis for avoiding insurance law is that the 
principal object of the transaction is other than to insure. Id. at 54–55.  But as we have 
seen, the principal object test is doubtful and has been expressly rejected in the U.K. 
See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Paul U. Ali, Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitizations: Innovation 
and Fragility, 20 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 293, 308 (2005); Paul U. Ali & Jan Job de 
Vries Robbé, New Frontiers in Credit Derivatives, 6 J. BANKING REG. 175, 181 (2005). 
 140. Saunders, supra note 6, at 435. 
 141. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CROSS-SECTOR RISK TRANSFERS, Annex B, at 2 (2002), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp11.pdf [hereinafter FSA, RISK 
TRANSFERS].  The reasons were: (i) some contracts may not have “no intention to 
insure” clauses; (ii) the reference event may have been defined in such a way that it is 
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repeated by the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ 2008 study on 
insurable interest.142  In the U.S., ISDA’s Potts-like argumentation was 
initially accepted by insurance regulators143 but after the financial crisis, 
was more carefully scrutinized and then rejected.144 
D. FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN INSURANCE LAW AND CDSS 
This section examines the arguments of Potts in more detail.  The 
easiest issue to tackle concerns the relationship between the legal form 
of a transaction and its so-called substance.  Given that CDSs are 
functionally very much like insurance, the question is whether their 
legal recharacterization can be avoided by shunning the language of 
insurance or by inserting “no intention to insure” clauses.  The brief 
answer is negative, but the matter merits a closer look, as it reveals some 
fundamental points about insurance law and CDSs. 
1. Insurance Law: The Primacy of Substance over Form 
Insurance regulation is not voluntary, and it cannot be avoided 
simply because the parties wish to do so.  It is, therefore, universally 
established that in insurance law, substance matters more than form.145  
This raises the question of what substance means. 
In English law, the notion of substance refers fundamentally to the 
obligation(s) of the insurance provider. 146   In CDS transactions, the 
obligation of the protection seller is to compensate for the loss of 
                                                                                                                                         
conceptually impossible for the event to occur without the protection buyer suffering a 
loss; (iii) there are also contracts of insurance that do not provide indemnity against 
actual loss; and (iv) “no intention to insure” clauses may not be definitive if there is 
evidence of a different true intention. Id. 
 142. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 7.10–7.17. 
They also noted the industry pressure against recharacterizing credit derivatives as 
insurance. Id. ¶ 7.11. 
 143. See infra Part II.H.1. 
 144. See infra Part II.H.3. 
 145. On U.S. law, see Hellner, supra note 83, at 500 (“Directly or indirectly this 
[formal] test is rejected almost universally.  It is not the term used, but the characteristic 
features of the activity that are held decisive.”).  On English law, see FSA, PERG, 
supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(1) (“[M]ore weight attaches to the substance of the contract, than 
to the form of the contract.”). 
 146. See FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(2) (citing In re Sentinel Securities 
(1996) 1 WLR 316). 
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reference asset value following a credit event because the protection 
seller assumes the credit risk in return for periodic consideration.147 
Substance does not mean merely the “economic effect” of the 
contract.  For example, a farmer may enter into a commodity futures 
transaction for hedging purposes, but the agreement does not thereby 
become an insurance contract.148  Contrary to Potts and his instructing 
solicitors, 149  the substance of the transaction does not refer to the 
intentions, motivations, or investment strategies of the parties.  The FSA 
specifically states that it “is unlikely to treat the provider’s or the 
customer’s intention or purpose in entering into a contract as relevant to 
its classification.”150 
The case law in the U.S. and England reveals that insurance law has 
been applied to many transactions in which the parties might have been 
unaware that they effected insurance, because the rights and obligations 
were essentially those of insurance.151  Of special interest for present 
purposes is the English case of Fuji Finance v. Aetna Life Insurance,152 
which concerned the legal nature of a financial transaction that consisted 
of a single premium capital investment bond that was used as a form of 
life insurance.153  At first instance, the court ruled that the contract was 
not insurance because there was no sufficiently close connection 
between the benefit and the adverse event.154  However, the Court of 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 4. 
 149. See Potts Instructions, supra note 132, at 8 (referring to prior discussions in 
which, according to Potts, the construction of a contract depends on “the rights, 
obligations and intentions of the parties” at the time of contracting); POTTS OPINION, 
supra note 49, ¶ 4 (arguing that construction must depend on “the object of both 
parties” because “otherwise some non-disclosed desire” by one party might turn the 
transaction into an insurance contract). 
 150. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(2). 
 151. In the U.S., consider, for example, the numerous burial contract cases. See 
Hellner, supra note 83, at 509–10.  In England, an amusing example is Dep’t of Trade 
& Indus. v. St. Christopher Motorists’ Ass’n Ltd. (1974) 1 All E.R. 395, where a 
motorist association’s promise to provide chauffeur services to its members if they lost 
their driving license as a result of being convicted of having too much alcohol in the 
blood was considered insurance. 
 152. Fuji Fin. Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1996), 4 All ER 608. 
 153. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.25 n.21 
(summarizing the case and its history). 
 154. See Fuji Fin. Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd (1994) 4 All ER 1025.  
According to LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.25 n.21, 
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Appeals reversed the ruling and held that the transaction constituted 
insurance, following a broad definition of life insurance.155 
Care should be exercised when drawing analogies from Fuji 
because the case involved peculiar facts and life insurance.  It is clear, 
however, that the Fuji decision, at first instance, cannot be relied upon 
(as was done by Potts’ instructing solicitors) to argue that a contract 
cannot be insurance when it has an investment element.156 
2. Transformers: The Sham Paradox 
In order to more clearly perceive that the rights and obligations in 
CDS transactions are essentially those of an insurance contract, it is 
useful to consider so-called transformer arrangements.  In these 
agreements, CDSs are sometimes explicitly transformed into insurance 
contracts in order to exploit differences between regulatory regimes in 
banking and insurance (i.e., regulatory capital, tax, and accounting 
differences).157  In a typical arrangement, a transformer company would 
first write the original CDS, and an authorized insurer would then insure 
the transformer company by way of traditional insurance or financial 
guaranty insurance.158 
This arrangement is especially revealing when the insurance leg 
incorporates the CDS terms “back to back.”159   Some lawyers have 
discouraged the incorporation of ISDA’s CDS documentation into the 
insurance contract because this creates the risk that a court will hold that 
the insurance policy written through the transformer was a sham.160  
However, writing independent terms and different provisions creates 
                                                                                                                                         
“there was uncertainty about when the money would become payable and it did not 
chiefly depend on the length of the insured life.” 
 155. See Fuji Fin. Inc. (1996) 4 All ER at 618 (finding that the essence of life 
insurance is that “the right to benefits is related to life or death”). 
 156. See Potts Instructions, supra note 132, at 8 (arguing this).  The interpretation of 
the Fuji cases is more nuanced in POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 4. 
 157. See FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, ¶¶ 3.25–3.29, 3.67, 3.107, 3.116; 
id. Annex A; id. Annex B, at 3–4 (discussing the structure, logic and implications of 
transformers); Ross & Davies, supra note 133, at 4–5 (describing transformers). 
 158. See FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, Annex B, at 3. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Ross & Davies, supra note 133, at 4–5; FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 
141, Annex B, at 4, and ¶ 3.108. 
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unwanted risks, and the FSA, in 2002, estimated that the standard 
approach had been to incorporate ISDA documentation.161 
The existence of transformers—and the incorporation of CDS 
terms—highlights the difficulty of claiming that CDSs differ from 
insurance in terms of the rights and obligations.  Such a claim would 
imply that two contracts that have exactly the same terms are governed 
by entirely different legal rules and regulatory regimes, even though 
insurance law is supposed to be determined by substance rather than 
form. 
There is also another paradox.  Some lawyers have argued that the 
insurance leg of the transformer arrangement might be construed as a 
sham, e.g., an illicit derivatives transaction (into which an insurance 
company would be prohibited from entering) masked as an insurance 
contract.  Yet, it could be argued that the CDS leg is a sham, e.g., an 
illicit insurance contract masked as a derivative.  These two prospects 
cannot both be true at the same time, and this Article submits that the 
latter view is better. 
3. Where Is the Swap in a Credit Default Swap? 
Some have argued that the deliberate avoidance of insurance 
language could be interpreted in favor of insurance classification if there 
is evidence of deliberate evasion of insurance regulation. 162   The 
relevance of that viewpoint becomes manifest when one asks the 
apparently childish question: where is the swap in a credit default swap? 
A “swap is a private agreement between two parties to exchange 
cash flows at certain times according to a prearranged formula.”163  In 
other words, a “swap is an exchange of cash flows.  A cash flow is a 
series of future cash payments.”164  However, a CDS is not an exchange 
of cash flows and definitely is not an exchange of credit defaults.165  
CDSs bear no functional resemblance to genuine swap agreements 
“[b]ecause the transaction is unilateral . . . , [so] it does not take the form 
                                                                                                                                         
 161. FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, Annex B, at 4, and ¶ 3.77. 
 162. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 163. Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 33, at 219 (emphasis added). 
 164. Feder, supra note 21, at 701 (emphasis added); see also Schuyler K. 
Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives: How and Why?, 8 J. INT’L BANKING 
L. 349, 349 (1993) [Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives] (providing a 
longer but similar description of swaps). 
 165. See Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives, supra note 164. 
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of a standard OTC swap contract, which is always bilateral.”166  Also, 
“[u]nlike other types of derivatives such as interest rate swaps, the risks 
assumed by the protection buyer and the protection seller in a CDS 
transaction are not symmetrical.”167  It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the emperor has no clothes: there is no swap in a CDS. 
E. INSURABLE INTEREST 
Potts correctly stated that legal construction depends on the rights 
and obligations specified in the contract.168  However, the parties may 
specify that they wish the contract to be valid even if the buyer has no 
insurable interest.  This section addresses whether this contract thereby 
becomes a non-insurance contract. 
1. The Requirement of an Insurable Interest 
Contrary to the Potts opinion and the claims of ISDA and others, 
insurable interest is not a demarcating factor of insurance law but rather, 
a requirement of validity in insurance.  “Every contract of insurance 
requires an insurable interest to support it; otherwise, it is invalid.”169  In 
other words, “insurable interest . . . is a requirement for a valid contract 
of insurance and not itself a defining feature of the contract.”170 
The standard explanation for the doctrine of insurable interest is 
that it reduces the risk of contracts that tempt the insured to bring about 
the loss insured against.171  This rationale is debatable,172 but this much 
is clear: the requirement of insurable interest is imposed by law, not by 
the contracting parties.  When the protection buyer has no insurable 
                                                                                                                                         
 166. BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 33. 
 167. Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 182. 
 168. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 169. E.R.H. IVAMY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 23 (1993); see also 
CLARKE, supra note 82, at 26. 
 170. FSA, INSURANCE, supra note 109, ¶ 2.10. 
 171. See Hazen, supra note 87, at 420–22 (describing the origin of the insurable 
interest doctrine). 
 172. See CLARKE, supra note 81, at 36–37 (critically discussing the traditional 
insurable interest doctrine). 
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interest, the contract becomes an invalid insurance contract, not a non-
insurance contract.173 
2. The Relationship Between Adverseness and Insurable Interest 
Perhaps, the misunderstanding of Potts and others is due to the 
belief that an insurable interest merely means that “an insurance contract 
must be a contract against the risk of loss.” 174   However, this 
formulation would merge insurable interest with the notion of 
adverseness.  There is some obiter dicta support for this view,175 but it 
seems to have been an unintended inaccuracy.176  The standard view is 
that adverseness is a wider notion than the legal requirement of 
insurable interest.177 
It would be incorrect to argue that CDSs are not insurance when the 
default of the reference obligations is not adverse to the protection 
buyers, because that treatment confuses adverseness with insurable 
interest.  Although the notion of an uncertain and adverse event tends to 
be underdefined,178 it essentially refers to the nature of the event, which 
must constitute a risk of loss for there to be insurance, whereas 
“insurable interest” refers to legal restrictions on who is permitted to 
purchase insurance on that event.179 
In property insurance, the existence of a transferable risk can 
normally be determined objectively, and credit default is “a risk of loss 
only,”180 much like fire, accident, or other property damage.  It is not 
insignificant that standard CDS terminology refers to “protection buyer” 
and “protection seller.”181  To be sure, persons who stand to benefit from 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 248–49; see also FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, 
supra note 141, Annex B, at 1 (noting this, and pointing out that some CDS buyers lack 
an insurable interest). 
 174. POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 4. 
 175. In the English case Medical Def. Union Ltd. v Dep’t (1979) 2 All ER 421, at 
423–24, Megarry VC used the notion of “insurable interest” as a defining element of 
insurance law. 
 176. See id.  Megarry was referring to Prudential, where the third element is 
adverseness, not insurable interest. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 177. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 7.20–7.23 
(summarizing literature to this effect). 
 178. See id. (citing different expressions). 
 179. See id. at 7.23. 
 180. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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the occurrence of the adverse event would view those events positively 
(i.e., someone would benefit from a fire at a competitor’s premises), but 
that does not affect the point: a fire insurance policy taken by an arsonist 
is not a permitted non-insurance contract (for want of subjective 
adverseness), but as an invalid insurance contract (for want of insurable 
interest).  Therefore, because conflating adverseness and insurable 
interest would effectively abolish the requirement of insurable interest, 
such treatment cannot be the meaning of the law. 
3. Practical Consequences 
Applying insurance law to CDSs would imply that some contracts 
would be invalid.  The general rule in property insurance is that the 
protection buyer must have an “economic interest”182 (e.g., a “‘factual 
expectation’ of loss”) in the property. 183 Importantly, this corresponds 
to an economic notion of hedging that is much broader than a 
requirement of holding the underlying debt.  English courts have 
traditionally been restrictive, requiring “‘a legal or equitable relation’ to 
the property,” 184  but recently, more liberal approaches have been 
adopted.185 
Although the matter is debatable, the requirement of an insurable 
interest would address the widely raised concerns related to CDS 
speculation. 186   Creating targeted rules for CDSs could reduce the 
consequential legal uncertainty.187 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3401 (McKinney 2014). 
 183. CLARKE, supra note 81, at 31 (citing Lucena v Craufurd (1806), 2 Bos & Pul 
(NR) 269 (HL)). The rule is similar in most common law countries, and in countries 
such as France and Germany, the only requirement is proof of loss at the time of claim. 
See id. at 32. 
 184. CLARKE, supra note 81, at 31 (citing Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. 
[1925] AC 619). 
 185. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 5.16–5.19 
(discussing Lord Justice Waller’s analysis in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co. [2003] 
EWCA Civ 885). 
 186. See supra notes 2, 42–43 and acompanying text. 
 187. See Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, ¶ 2 (discussing this 
approach in the European Short Selling Regulation). 
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F. LOSS INDEMNITY 
A related but distinct source of confusion is the notion of loss 
indemnity.  This section addresses whether CDSs are indemnity or non-
indemnity contracts, and whether that distinction matters for their legal 
classification.  The below analysis leads to the conclusion that CDSs are 
normally indemnity insurance contracts, although they may sometimes 
be non-indemnity insurance contracts.  
1. Are CDSs Indemnity or Non-Indemnity Insurance? 
The difference between indemnity and non-indemnity (also called 
contingency) insurance refers to the way that compensation is 
calculated.  In indemnity insurance, payment is made according to 
“actual measurable loss” whereas non-indemnity insurance involves “a 
pre-determined sum.”188  Non-indemnity contracts are common in life 
and personal accident insurance because it is difficult to translate those 
harms into monetary terms, so predetermined compensation reduces 
costs and uncertainty.189 
Which type is a CDS?  Given that it promises payment regardless 
of proof of loss suffered by a CDS buyer, it might seem like a non-
indemnity contract.190  However, this is inaccurate: the legal distinction 
is not based on the requirement of proof of loss but rather, on whether 
compensation is determined ex ante or ex post.  CDS payments are 
calculated after the event and according to the loss of value of the 
reference obligations, not according to a pre-determined lump-sum 
amount.191  CDSs do not refer to personal loss by the protection buyer, 
but that is irrelevant.  What matters is that compensation depends on the 
loss of value of the reference assets, and this is the case in both physical 
and cash settlement procedures.192  Therefore, CDSs function like any 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. CLARKE, supra note 81, at 27. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.9 (“In essence 
they [credit derivatives] “fulfil many of the common law definitions of non-indemnity 
insurance.”).  Unfortunately the reasons for that view are not elaborated. 
 191. On the level of principle, there is agreement that “non-indemnity contracts . . . 
pay a lump sum regardless of the amount . . . that is lost.” Id. ¶ 7.14. 
 192. Physical settlement implicitly provides full compensation, whereas cash 
settlement as based on an approximation of the loss of value. See supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
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indemnity transaction and differ essentially from non-indemnity 
insurance.193 
According to a different interpretation, covered CDSs, which “are 
designed to indemnify the protection buyer against loss suffered due to 
default . . . for example a bank entering a CDS to protect against 
borrower default . . . are in essence a form of indemnity insurance.”194  
In contrast, uncovered CDSs would be contingency transactions. 195  
However, this analysis confuses two different questions.  The first 
distinction, between covered and uncovered transactions, refers to the 
risk position of the protection buyer, which depends on extra-contractual 
factors and is relevant for determining whether the purchaser has an 
insurable interest.  The second distinction, between indemnity and 
contingency insurance, refers to the calculation of the payment amount 
and depends on the contract terms.  Even covered CDSs are non-
indemnity transactions if the payment amount is predetermined rather 
than calculated after the fact.  Similarly, uncovered CDSs are indemnity 
transactions if the payment amount is calculated by reference to a loss of 
value. 
2. Non-Indemnity Insurance in Property 
The distinction has some practical implications, but they are not 
fundamental.196  There is confusion here too, as some commentators 
have supposed that if CDSs are non-indemnity transactions, they could 
not be re-characterized as insurance.197 
However, that is incorrect because non-indemnity insurance is a 
recognized category of non-life insurance too.198  In addition to personal 
accident insurance, there are non-indemnity contracts in property 
                                                                                                                                         
 193. See Medical Def. Union Ltd. v Dep’t (1979) 2 All ER 42, 422 (noting that in 
indemnity insurance, “the measure of the loss is the measure of the payment”, whereas 
in contingency insurance, “[t]he sum to be paid is not measured by the loss but is stated 
in the policy”). 
 194. Saunders, supra note 6, at 435. 
 195. See id. 
 196. For example, the timing of the insurable interest requirement is different. See 
CLARKE, supra note 81, at 27. 
 197. Id. (“As there is not generally recognised category of contingency insurance, 
and these types of CDS are not contracts of life insurance, they escape regulation as 
insurance products.”). 
 198. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 1.17, 3.64–
3.68, 7.42 (discussing non-life, non-indemnity insurance). 
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insurance, such as “insurance policies on land, buildings, ships, goods 
and merchandise,” paying “a fixed sum on the destruction of these 
items.” 199   These policies “do not require the policyholder to have 
suffered a loss.”200 
G. WEAK POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST RE-CHARACTERIZING CDSS AS 
INSURANCE 
Perhaps, the only reasonable argument against re-characterizing 
CDSs as insurance is that insurance law should not apply for practical 
reasons.  For example, one claim is that CDSs should be subject to 
insurance law because the “fundamental objectives of many CDS 
transactions set them apart from garden-variety insurance contracts.”201  
However, the fundamental objective of covered CDSs is precisely an 
insurance objective.202  The rest (uncovered CDSs) are speculative bets 
on borrower default that raise important policy concerns like those that 
gave rise to the insurable interest requirement.203 
According to another argument, the regulations that accompany 
insurance products are not needed because “virtually 100% of both the 
protection buyers and sellers are institutional investors, with the public 
having no exposure, or virtually none, to these contracts.”204  However, 
the second part of this claim is manifestly untrue.  Firstly, the public has 
an interest in the stability of the financial system, which recent 
experience shows can be fundamentally devastated by sizable CDS 
contracts sold without sufficient loss reserves.205  Secondly, uncovered 
CDSs enable investors to take directional bets that otherwise would be 
prohibited and that demonstrably have an adverse effect on the 
borrowing costs for many companies.206 
                                                                                                                                         
 199. Id. ¶ 7.42. 
 200. Id. ¶ 7.14. 
 201. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 182. 
 202. This view is acknowledged even by Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not 
“Insurance”, supra note 3, at 4. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 79, at 15; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 
182 (supporting this argument); Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 
supra note 3, at 45–46 (arguing that, with CDSs, there is no need for consumer 
protection). 
 205. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text; Saunders, supra note 6, at 445–
447 (presenting reasons why CDSs create systemic risks). 
 206. See supra note 43. 
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A third argument is that CDSs have become so commonly treated 
as unregulated derivatives that re-characterizing them would destabilize 
financial markets. 207   However, legislative reform that includes a 
transition period could re-characterize CDSs without disrupting the 
markets.208 
A more complicated argument that calls for further investigation is 
that insurance law would impose unnecessary costs without solving 
problems. 209   For the time being, it is important to avoid such 
exaggerations, such as the assertion that “[c]redit derivatives help 
complete these [loan] markets by allowing the bank to offload the risk to 
investors who can more efficiently bear it.”210  In reality, the risks are 
often sold to investors who are simply more lightly regulated, such as 
unregulated hedge funds. 211   Moreover, the creation of a targeted 
regulatory regime for CDSs would improve the suitability of insurance 
regulation. 212   Therefore, these arguments against re-characterizing 
CDSs as insurance are flawed, unsubstantiated, or speculate downsides 
that could be prevented. 
H. THE EVOLVING POSITION OF U.S. INSURANCE REGULATORS 
The thinking of U.S. insurance regulators concerning CDSs has 
evolved substantially, so a chronological analysis is best to understand 
this change.  The evolution reveals the complex interplay of legal, 
financial, and political forces at state and federal levels.213 
                                                                                                                                         
 207. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (emphasizing commercial 
expectations). 
 208. See id. 
 209. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 46–
55 (arguing to this effect). 
 210. Id. at 29. 
 211. See supra note 41; Wynkoop, supra note 55, at 3105–07 (explaining how 
hedge funds are involved in credit derivatives and create systemic risks). 
 212. For example, see Saunders, supra note 6, at 441–42 (proposing CDS issuers be 
subject to prudential regulation, without subjecting CDSs to the regulation of insurance 
contracts generally). 
 213. Insurance regulation in the U.S. is principally determined at state level, based 
on the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, which has been criticized. See Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the 
Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y. U. L. REV. 13 (1993), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1605/. 
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1. The New York Opinion of 2000 
U.S. insurance regulators first touched upon the question of credit 
derivatives in 2000 to respond to an inquiry from the banking industry 
when the General Counsel of the New York State Insurance Department 
(“NYSID”) opined that credit default options are not insurance contracts 
if the contractual payment does not require that the protection buyer 
suffered a loss.214  Although the opinion was non-binding and did not 
necessarily extend to all CDSs,215 it was relied upon,216 and New York 
insurance regulators did not interfere with the CDS market until 2008.217 
2. The 2003 White Paper on Weather Derivatives 
The first signs that not all insurance regulators agreed with the 
opinion of the NYSID General Counsel appeared in 2003, when the U.S. 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted a 
White Paper inquiry into weather derivatives. 218   The draft, entitled 
Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature): Insurance or Capital 
Markets Products?, took the view that weather derivatives 
appear to be disguised as “non-insurance” products to avoid being 
classified and regulated as insurance products. In fact, there is 
evidence that the promoters of these products go to great lengths to 
be sure that the energy companies involved do not use terms that 
naturally describe what is taking place—namely the transfer of risk 
from a business to another professional risk taker.219 
                                                                                                                                         
 214. See Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 247 (quoting Re: Credit Default Option 
Facility, NY Dep’t of Ins. Gen. Counsel June 16, 2000) (“Indemnification of loss is an 
essential indicia of an insurance contract which courts have relied upon in the analysis 
of whether a particular agreement is an insurance contract under New York law.  
Absent such a contractual provision the instrument is not an insurance contract.”). 
 215. Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein In Credit 
Default Swaps?  An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 618 (2011). 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180–81; Kimball-Stanley, supra 
note 3, at 250. 
 219. See Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 250 (citing PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS. 
COMM., WEATHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (TEMPERATURE): INSURANCE OR CAPITAL 
MARKET PRODUCTS? (Sept. 2, 2003)). 
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The draft White Paper thus argued that weather derivatives are 
insurance contracts and should be regulated as such.  Although it 
covered only weather derivatives, the position and reasoning of NAIC 
was “equally applicable to credit derivatives.” 220   The derivatives 
industry was extremely worried about the White Paper and commenced 
an intense lobbying effort headed by ISDA.221  The ISDA argued that 
the “Draft White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad array of 
derivatives and would create substantial and disruptive regulatory 
uncertainty.”222  Soon after, NAIC not only shelved the regulatory plans 
but also withdrew the White Paper from publication.223 
3. Reconsideration After the Financial Crisis of 2008 
The financial crisis of 2008 generated new interest in the matter.  In 
September 2008, NYSID Superintendent Eric Dinallo wrote a Circular 
Letter that essentially reversed the position of the NYSID: “the making 
of the CDS itself may constitute ‘the doing of an insurance business’ 
within the meaning of Insurance Law § 1101, [in which case,] the 
protection seller should be licensed as an insurer.”224 
Dinallo’s reasoning was not entirely clear at this stage.  Trying to 
maintain the 2000 non-binding opinion, he argued that the opinion “did 
not grapple with whether . . . a CDS is an insurance contract when it is 
purchased by a party who, at the time at which the agreement is entered 
into, holds, or reasonably expects to hold, a ‘material interest’ in the 
referenced obligation.”225  In a testimony before a Senate Committee, 
Dinallo pointed out that the 2000 opinion had been given in response to 
“a very carefully crafted question” that did not cover the CDS market as 
                                                                                                                                         
 220. Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180. 
 221. See Letter from Joshua D. Cohn, U.S. Legal Counsel, ISDA, to Ernst N. 
Csiszar, President, NAIC (Jan. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/NAICletter010604.pdf (explaining that “ISDA is 
extremely concerned” about the draft white paper); Letter from Robert G. Pickel, supra 
note 129 (arguing that weather derivatives are not insurance). 
 222. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, supra note 129, at 2. 
 223. ISDA, Member Update (Mar. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/NAICUpdate-032404.pdf (publicizing the success of 
the lobbying effort); Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180–181; Kimball-
Stanley, supra note 3, at 250. 
 224. Dinallo, supra note 70, at 7. 
 225. Id. at 7. 
2014] DECODING THE MYSTERY OF  463 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
a whole.226  So, he argued that covered CDSs were insurance contracts 
whereas “naked” (uncovered) CDSs were not. 227   As previously 
explained, this distinction arises out of confusion regarding the insurable 
interest doctrine.228 
On the same day that the Circular Letter was published, New York 
Governor David A. Paterson announced that New York State would 
begin to regulate CDSs as insurance as of January 1, 2009.229  This 
caused a barrage of criticism from the financial lobby and its legal 
representatives.230  The question, however, was not whether insurance 
supervisors understood derivatives but whether CDSs were insurance—
something that the supervisors presumably did understand.231  It turned 
out that state insurance legislators were increasingly determined to 
answer the question in the affirmative.232 
4. Plans to Regulate CDSs as Insurance 
The banking industry wasted no time fighting the new plan to 
regulate CDSs as insurance.  Criticism and lobbying must have been 
intense given that just two months after Superintendent Dinallo’s 
opinion, he announced that “New York will delay indefinitely its 
                                                                                                                                         
 226. Eric Dinallo, Testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry 5 (Oct. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_ins/sp0810141.pdf.  The exact question was: 
“Does a credit default swap transaction, wherein the seller will make payment to the 
buyer upon the happening of a negative credit event and such payment is not dependent 
upon the buyer having suffered a loss, constitute a contract of insurance under the 
insurance law?” See id. 
 227. Id. at 3. 
 228. Insurable interest is not a factor of demarcation, but a requirement of validity. 
See supra Parts II.E.1–2. 
 229. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, N.Y. 
TIMES, C10 (Sept. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23swap.html. 
 230. Adam W. Glass, Credit Derivatives as Insurance: In Race to Regulate CDS, 
Wrong Runner Takes Early Lead (Oct. 2, 2008), at 5, available at 
www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/us/ 
021030_Prudence_Payback.pdf (“Let’s hope [that] this ill-considered proposal can be 
promptly squelched, allowing the Insurance Department to go back to regulating 
something it understands—insurance.”). 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Morelle, supra note 60, at 3 (describing the movement to regulate CDSs as 
insurance). 
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application of New York Insurance Law to CDS” in anticipation of 
federal regulation.233  That seems to have been the last intervention of 
the NYSID in the matter. 
However, the insurance movement continued.  In 2009, the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) prepared 
legislation that would regulate covered CDSs—defined as those whose 
buyers have a material interest in the reference entity—as credit default 
insurance, and the providers would be subject to state insurance 
regulations for credit default insurance corporations.  In contrast, naked 
CDSs would be entirely banned.234  The NCOIL Model Act for credit 
default insurance was essentially based on New York laws regulating 
financial guaranty insurance.235  In April 2010, a New York State bill 
sought to regulate covered CDSs as financial guaranty products under 
New York Insurance Law and to ban naked CDSs.236 
However, in a foreseeable response, the banking lobby sought 
federal preemption. 237   It became increasingly clear that the Obama 
administration was determined to federally regulate CDSs as derivatives 
and preempt their regulation as insurance.238  Some Senators tried to get 
an insurable interest requirement into the Dodd-Frank Act, but that was 
                                                                                                                                         
 233. Eric R. Dinallo, State of New York Ins. Dep’t, First Supplement to Circular 
Letter No. 19, Re: “Best Practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers (Nov. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19s1.htm; see also 
Bloink, supra note 215, at 619 (noting that the plan was dropped under pressure from 
the banking industry). 
 234. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, The National Conference of Insurance 
Legislators’ Model CDS Bill (June 3, 2009), at 3, available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/ea407c52-63cb-45b7-9bf0-
7d9ce12400f1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2ccba63d-5ad8-4078-97fe-
83aea7f2b70b/06.03.09.NCOIL 
.pdf (providing an overview of the draft model legislation); NCOIL, NCOIL Moves to 
Regulate Credit Default Swaps, Press Release (April 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/ 
2009/0492009CDSCallPressRelease.pdf.  The final version of the Model Act is 
available at http://www.ncoil.org/docs/cdsmodelact.pdf. 
 235. Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 234, at 2. 
 236. N.Y. Assembly A10783, 233rd Sess. (N.Y. 2010); Sidley Austin LLP, Bill 
Introduced in New York Legislature to Regulate ‘Credit Default Insurance’ Based on 
NCOIL Model (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.sidley.com/insurance_and_financial_services_update_050310. 
 237. Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 234, at 6. 
 238. Id. at 6. 
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rejected.239  As a result, CDSs became regulated as derivatives instead of 
insurance. 
III. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS DERIVATIVES 
The analysis in Part III raises many follow-up questions.  How is it 
possible that the application of insurance law to some or all CDSs was 
so widely ignored and so easily avoided?  How could CDSs be globally 
established as unregulated “swaps” when they are economically not 
swaps at all?  Why did the Dodd-Frank Act preempt insurance 
regulation seemingly without debate? 240   One might suggest that it 
simply took time for insurance regulators to grasp what these 
transactions really consisted of, but such an answer is far from complete. 
This Part argues that the issue can only be understood in light of a 
longer historical evolution marked by two opposing forces: anti-
speculation and pro-regulation initiatives on one side and anti-regulatory 
and regulation-evasive initiatives on the other.  Part III.A briefly 
outlines the historical background of more recent developments.  Then, 
Part III.B describes the leading role played by International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association in the creation of an unregulated space for OTC 
swaps.  Finally, Part III.C analyzes the Dodd-Frank Act reforms and 
finds that, although they seek to rein in the excesses of modern finance, 
they paradoxically end up consolidating ISDA’s largely unregulated 
swaps regime. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LAW VS. FINANCE 
1. Traditional Anti-speculation Law 
The relationship between law and finance has been tense 
throughout history: legislators have placed various restrictions on 
financial activity, ranging from limits on interest-taking to a marked 
                                                                                                                                         
 239. See Ronald D. Orol, Senators Reject Effort to End Debate on Bank Bill, 
MARKETWATCH (May 19, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/rejection-of-
democrat-measures-may-slow-bank-bill-2010-05-19 (discussing the Senate’s rejection 
of Senator Dorgan’s amendment, which would have imposed an insurable interest 
requirement on CDSs). 
 240. See infra note 378 and accompanying text. 
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hostility towards speculative activities.241  In particular, the law of many 
countries traditionally viewed gambling as a socially undesirable 
activity, either prohibiting or heavily regulating it.242  The law’s disdain 
of gambling was not limited to cards and casino, as also “investing, 
hedging, and insurance have been compared with gambling and, to 
varying degrees, social distaste for gambling has been used as a 
rationale for regulation of these other activities.”243  Thus, for example, 
common law courts frequently refused to enforce commodity forward 
contracts—often called difference contracts—if they were perceived as 
speculative wagers instead of hedging transactions.244 
2. The Rise of Private Orderings 
Insofar as the only problem was the refusal to enforce the contracts, 
market participants found a way to avoid the restrictions by way of 
private orderings, i.e. by creating extra-legal arrangements for enforcing 
contracts without resorting to courts.245   The leading example is the 
commodity exchanges created since the mid-19th century, developing 
mechanisms for not only trading physical commodities, but also 
speculating in changes in price in ways that could be enforced without 
courts.246  Over time, the exchanges created a self-regulatory system 
                                                                                                                                         
 241. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private 
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 703 (1999) [hereinafter 
Stout, Speculators] 
 242. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit 
Crisis, 1 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2011) [hereinafter Stout, Legal Origin], 
available at http://www.hblr.org/download/HBLR_1_1/Stout-
Derivatives_and_the_Credit_Crisis.pdf (discussing the traditional common law 
approach); Hazen, supra note 87, at 377 (“[G]ambling is not generally viewed as a 
productive activity or one that provides any benefit to society beyond its entertainment 
value [which] is generally seen as outweighed by the social costs of gambling.”). 
 243. Hazen, supra note 87, at 377. 
 244. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 11–12 (discussing cases); Stout, 
Speculators, supra note 241, at 712–34 (discussing a range of U.S. “antispeculation” 
laws, both in common law and statute). 
 245. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
 246. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 14–15 (describing this 
development).  For a detailed study, see Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: 
Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-
1905, 3 AM. HIST. REV. 307 (2006). 
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consisting of “membership standards, collateral (‘margin’) posting 
requirements, capital requirements, and standardized contract terms”.247 
One interesting aspect of the legal evolution is that the success of 
respectable exchanges also attracted secondary business—so called 
“bucket shops”—which copied the betting opportunities without 
imposing membership requirements.248  These contracts were in many 
ways analogous to what now are called “over-the-counter” 
derivatives. 249   However, many U.S. states criminalized these OTC 
activities with the so-called “anti-bucketshop” laws; the exchanges 
started their parallel attacks against price quotation stealing, and were 
backed by the courts.250  In summary, speculative derivative contracts 
were permitted, but only within self-regulatory spaces. 
3. The 1930s Regulatory Regime and Its Erosion 
The self-regulatory regime for speculative contracts was shattered 
following the Great Crash of 1929, which reawakened the traditional 
anti-speculative attitudes. 251   This led to a new wave of federal 
legislation that still forms the backbone of U.S. financial regulation.252  
In relation to financial derivatives, the 1930s legislation had two 
principal effects.  Firstly, in line with earlier common law and state anti-
bucketshop statutes, the legislation—particularly the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 253 —reinforced the prohibition of OTC 
speculative activities by requiring that all transactions take place in 
regulated exchanged (called “contract markets”). 254  Secondly, it 
subjected the exchanges to public supervision under a hybrid regulatory 
system that combines elements of self-regulatory and command-and-
control regulation, headed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                                                                                                         
 247. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 16. 
 248. Id. at 16–17. 
 249. Id. at 17. 
 250. Id. at 16–17. 
 251. See David Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation, 
14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 856, 861 (2008) (noting how the Crash caused an attack on 
speculators). 
 252. See, e.g., Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 429–33 (discussing 
the federal regime and its general problems with respect to derivatives). 
 253. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (as amended). 
 254. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18 (“Federal law, like state 
antibucketshop statutes, went beyond the common law by making off-exchange futures 
illegal as well as judicially unenforceable.”). 
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(“SEC,” for securities options) and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC,” for commodity futures and options).255 
Over time, however, this regime of contract-market monopoly was 
eroded by three principal factors.  Firstly, market participants began to 
design novel contracts in order to fit them into exemptions to the 
regulated markets (a form of regulatory arbitrage).256  Secondly, turf 
battles between the two regulators tended to widen the regulatory gaps, 
as there emerged difficulties in fitting new instruments into the 
traditional categories of “securities” and “futures.” 257   Thirdly, 
especially from the 1980s onwards, the rule-book was increasingly 
liberalized: on one hand, many financial contracts were excluded from 
the ambit of gaming laws, and gambling itself was gradually 
legalized; 258  on the other hand, OTC derivatives were expressly 
deregulated by way of a process that is next described in detail.259 
B. THE PATH TO UNREGULATED SWAPS: THE INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION 
Deregulated OTC derivatives have roots in the 19th century, but 
their spectacular growth and global consolidation is a more recent 
phenomenon, which cannot be understood without reference to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 255. See, e.g., PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES 
REGULATION: VOLUME 1 § 2.02 (2004) (describing the system of contract market 
monopoly). 
 256. Hazen, supra note 87, at 390; see also JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 255, § 
1.02[8] (describing the deterioration of the exchange monopoly). 
 257. Hazen, supra note 87, at 390; Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, 
at 431–33 (describing turf battles). 
 258. See Hazen, supra note 87, at 396–97 (noting the liberalization of gambling 
laws).  In the U.S., many states continue to have restrictive gambling laws, whereas in 
the U.K., gambling was drastically liberalized by the Gambling Act 2005 (UK).  
However, it had been emphasized earlier that bona fide commercial or financial 
transactions will not be held to be wagering contracts. See Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn 
Hatfield District Council [1995] 1 AER 1. 
 259. On the process in the U.S., see Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18–22; 
on the U.K., see Colin Scott & John Biggins, Public-Private Relations in a 
Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, The State and OTC Derivatives 
Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 318–19 (2012) (explaining that the 
enforceability of purely speculative OTC derivatives was guaranteed first by section 60 
the Financial Services Act 1986 (UK), and then by section 8 the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (UK)). 
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International Swaps and Derivatives Association.260  The role of one 
organization should not be exaggerated, but there is no reason to be 
dismissive about ISDA which, according Frank Partnoy, has been “the 
most powerful and effective lobbying force in the recent history of 
financial markets.”261  According to Scott and Biggins, “[t]he influence 
of ISDA is undoubtedly a key factor in the public deregulation of OTC 
derivatives trading by legislators in the latter 20th century, especially in 
the US.” 262   Flanagan agrees that “ISDA has played a key role in 
keeping the OTC derivatives industry self-regulated.”263 
1. ISDA’s Origins and Activities 
ISDA was born in the 1980s, when Wall Street investment banks 
began to develop novel over-the-counter derivatives transactions such as 
swaps.264   A leading motivation for OTC derivatives was regulatory 
arbitrage, as it was thought that “swaps were unregulated and immune 
from most securities-law disclosure requirements.”265  They were also 
apparently subject to “off balance sheet” accounting treatment, which 
made their risks less transparent and enabled banks to offer products that 
are functionally equivalent to positions that client institutions were not 
                                                                                                                                         
 260. ISDA has only lately has attracted scholarly interest. See, e.g., Braithwaite, 
supra note 13 (discussing ISDA’s Master Agreement regime); Gelpern & Gulati, supra 
note 17 (discussing ISDA’s dispute resolution system); Scott & Biggins, supra note 259 
(discussing ISDA’s relations with nation states); Huault & Rainelli-Le Montagner, 
supra note 128 (describing ISDA’s influence strategies); Glenn Morgan, Legitimacy in 
Financial Markets: Credit Default Swaps in the Current Crisis, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 
17, 32–40 (2010) (discussing ISDA’s activities following the 2008 crisis); HEATHER 
MCKEEN-EDWARDS & TONY PORTER, TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND 
THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: ASSEMBLING POWER AND WEALTH 43–46 
(2013) (describing ISDA’s role in global finance).  One of the early studies on ISDA’s 
activities is Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of the Trade Association: Group Interactions 
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
211 (2001) (providing a pro-ISDA perspective to its history and activities). 
 261. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 47 (2004) [hereinafter PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED]. 
 262. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 323. 
 263. Flanagan, supra note 260, at 246. 
 264. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 38–45 (describing early 
swaps and other derivatives transactions). 
 265. Id. at 48. 
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permitted to take. 266   Besides, as non-exchange transactions, many 
swaps were customized and therefore highly profitable to the dealers.267 
It seems that at first the investment banks largely ignored the fact 
that the new OTC derivatives may have been void under the common 
law and illegal under the Commodity Exchange Act.268  But the first 
source of worries was the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the 
U.S. accounting self-regulatory body), which in February 1985 started 
asking difficult questions about the new products.269  This led, within 
weeks after the inquiry, to the formation of the International Swap 
Dealers’ Association. 270   The name was changed into International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association in 1993,271 seemingly “in an attempt 
to show ISDA was more than just a lobbying vehicle for the top swap 
dealers.”272 
ISDA’s principal objectives were “to establish standardized 
documentation and practices, to lobby against new regulations, and to 
determine how big the swaps market really was.”273  In the words of one 
of the leading members, the goal was to “organize before any problems 
arise”,274 although ISDA’s first press release merely stated that it sought 
to “advance general market practices and to discuss issues of relevance 
to the financial community.”275   It has been claimed that “everyone 
involved understood that the primary role would be to lobby against 
                                                                                                                                         
 266. Id. at 45–46 (describing banks’ activities and arguments); Partnoy, Derivatives 
Regulation, supra note 53, at 426–28 (describing regulatory arbitrage uses of early 
derivatives).  Avoiding regulations was a motivating factor even before the 1980s. See 
Flanagan, supra note 260, at 223 (“Some simple swap-like agreements were developed 
in the late seventies to bypass certain United Kingdom currency restrictions”). 
 267. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 49; Partnoy, Derivatives 
Regulation, supra note 53, at 427–28 (noting that customized swaps are more profitable 
than “plain vanilla” swaps); Flanagan, supra note 260, at 234 (“Banks [in the 1980s] 
received large fees and substantial spreads for arranging interest-rate and currency 
swaps”). 
 268. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; Stout, Speculators, supra note 241, 
at 780. 
 269. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 46. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Flanagan, supra note 260, at 222. 
 272. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 152. 
 273. Id at 47. 
 274. John P. Forde, Big Firms Involved in Rate Swaps Form Dealers Association, 
THE BOND BUYER, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1985) (citing Jonathan Berg, a vice president at 
Bankers Trust). 
 275. Id. 
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regulation of swaps”,276 although it seems that a parallel motivation was 
to coordinate the ownership and development of the standard 
documentation, which the leading swap dealers had developed 
informally since 1984.277 
2. A Friend of Courts and Lawyers 
The first ISDA Master Agreement related to swaps was published 
in 1987, and generic OTC derivatives Master Agreements have been 
published in 1992 and 2002.278  The importance of the ISDA Master 
Agreement project extends far beyond copyright protection, because 
what began as ordinary contract standardization became, over time, 
something of “an industry-wide constitution.” 279   Today, ISDA’s 
“standard form documentation enjoys a near-monopoly in the vast 
‘over-the-counter’ derivatives markets.”280 
ISDA’s contractual self-governance project includes an active 
relationship with the courts through its amicus curiae briefs in OTC 
derivatives litigation.281  These interventions are fundamental, because 
they seek to persuade courts of “ISDA’s preferences” regarding the 
interpretation of the standardized documents.282  Given ISDA’s expertise 
and its role as the originator of the contracting scheme, it is likely to 
yield significant interpretative power in courts.283 
Apart from courts, ISDA works closely with leading law firms, 
having over the years developed a network of cooperating lawyers 
around the world.284  The leading example of ISDA’s influence among 
                                                                                                                                         
 276. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 47. 
 277. See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 234–38 (describing the standardization 
project). 
 278. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 787.  On the development of the ISDA Master 
Agreements, see Flanagan, supra note 260, at 243–45. 
 279. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 17, at 357. 
 280. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 779. 
 281. See ISDA, Amicus Briefs, http://www.isda.org/speeches/amicusbriefs.html (last 
visited June 2, 2014). 
 282. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 326. 
 283. See supra note 47.  To be sure, courts have not always accepted ISDA’s 
proposals. See Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 799–800 (discussing English cases).  
However, in these cases the principal reason was that “the contractual language left 
room for disagreement.” Id. at 800. 
 284. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 260, at 233 (“ISDA has hired law firms around 
the world to research the potential enforceability of close-out netting in their 
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lawyers is the Potts opinion, which “was unanimously acknowledged as 
one of the great successes of the organization.”285  Together with its 
allies, ISDA skillfully created the appearance of a legal consensus, 
receiving the support of prestigious law firms, which appeared in the 
debate without disclosing their close ties to ISDA.286 
The ISDA-generated legal consensus has been supported by the 
logic of courts in London and New York, which in resolving 
international finance disputes are highly sensible to the practical 
consequences of their decisions, applying “laws or ideas from several 
different jurisdictions in order to reach a commercially sensible result” 
and attempting to “make decisions that will facilitate international 
finance.”287  This decision-making is shaped by what Goode has called 
judicial parallelism,288 whereby courts are reluctant to break an apparent 
consensus among leading jurisdictions in matters of international 
finance. 289   Therefore, creating the appearance of consensus has the 
power to shape the law itself, because courts are unlikely to challenge it. 
Unsurprisingly, the ISDA Master Agreement of 1992 and 2002 
propose exclusive jurisdiction to either English or New York courts.290  
These choice-of-law provisions can be sidestepped, but parties are 
warned that “extreme care should be exercised in doing so since the 
ISDA master agreement has not been prepared with a view to 
enforceability under other legal systems.”291  This warning is important, 
because choice of law and jurisdiction is important for managing legal 
                                                                                                                                         
jurisdictions”); id. at 235 (describing long-standing cooperation with Cravath, Swaine 
& Moore); id. at 240 (showing how several key ISDA figures came from Cravath).  
Later, Adam W. Glass of Linklaters has been an active collaborator. See supra notes 51, 
230. 
 285. Huault & Rainelli-Le Montagner, supra note 128, at 559–60. 
 286. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.  Flanagan reveals that “Allen 
& Overy functions as ISDA’s primary European counsel.” Flanagan, supra note 260, at 
233.  Schwartz also turns out to be an Allen & Overy Associate. Schwartz, supra note 
4, at 167. 
 287. Agasha Mugasha, International Financial Law: Is the Law Really 
“International” and Is It “Law” Anyway?, 26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2011) 
[hereinafter Mugasha, International Financial Law]. 
 288. ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 92 (1998). 
 289. Mugasha, International Financial Law, supra note 287, at 443 (citing 
Lordsvale Finance Plc v. Bank of Zambia, 3 All E.R. 156 [1996]). 
 290. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 789. 
 291. SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES 838 (2010). 
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risk related to “conflicting views as to the true nature, the contractual 
obligations, or the consequences of the financial transaction.”292 
3. Lobbying Victories in the 1990s: Widening the Regulatory 
Exemptions 
Cooperation with courts and lawyers was essential to financial 
deregulation, as “the ISDA Master Agreement project was highly 
successful in assuring public actors that the OTC derivatives industry 
was in fact capable of largely self-regulating.” 293   However, this 
obviously was not enough.  If the dealers and investment banks were at 
first dismissive of legal risks, this did not last long, and by the end of the 
1980s, they were actively trying to change the rules.294 Throughout the 
1990s a key input for legal reform in financial markets came from the 
banking industry,295 and ISDA played a lead role.296 
The rhetorical keyword was “legal certainty”.297  What this meant 
was certainty that the regulators would not apply the restrictive rules—
especially the exchange-trading requirement of the Commodity 
Exchange Act (“CEA”)—to the new OTC transactions, which clearly 
had been made in violation of the rules.298  While there is no doubt about 
ISDA’s professional competence, it has over the years acquired a 
reputation for its aggressive lobbying methods. 299   These have been 
described as “both condescending (saying officials couldn’t possible 
understand derivatives) and reassuring (saying Wall Street had 
everything under control).”300   According to one testimony from the 
1990s, “ISDA came to Washington telling everyone they’re stupid.  
Their message was that everything is okay [in derivatives]—a blanket 
                                                                                                                                         
 292. Mugasha, International Financial Law, supra note 287, at 393; see also id. at 
408–09. 
 293. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 323. 
 294. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; Stout, Speculators, supra note 241, 
at 780. 
 295. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18–20 (describing banking industry 
initiatives in the 1990s). 
 296. See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 245–46 (highlighting ISDA’s growing 
involvement in politics in the 1990s). 
 297. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 142 (describing Mark C. 
Brickell, vice president at J.P. Morgan and ISDA’s “top lobbyist” in the 1990s). 
 300. Id. 
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statement, boom.”301  This rhetoric has been backed up by threats that 
campaign donations would suffer, as financial firms spend large 
amounts of money in political contributions and lobbying, and “ISDA’s 
members were major political contributors.” 302 
A modest victory was gained in 1989, when the CFTC issued a safe 
harbor policy statement, “declaring that [it] would not attempt to 
regulate swap transactions.” 303   However, this had at least two 
limitations.  One was that the CFTC policy statement listed five criteria 
for applying the safe harbor, in summary: “(1) individually tailored 
terms; (2) absence of exchange-style offset; (3) absence of clearing 
organization or margin system; (4) the transaction is undertaken in 
conjunction with a line of business; and (5) prohibition against 
marketing to the public.”304  According to Partnoy, “[f]or many swaps at 
least one of the criteria—often several—were not satisfied.”305 
The second limitation of the 1989 safe harbor was that it did not 
change the fundamental rules, because the CFTC had no authority to re-
write the rule-book.  However, following intense lobbying, Congress in 
1992 passed the Futures Trading Practices Act,306 granting the CFTC 
authority to exempt derivatives from the application of the CEA, and 
determining that “federal law now preempted any state laws that made 
OTC derivatives unenforceable, whether as gambling contracts or 
otherwise.” 307   This was promptly followed by the CFTC in 1993 
formally exempting OTC swaps from the ambit of the CEA, as well as 
from state gambling and antibucketshop laws.308  However, the 1993 
                                                                                                                                         
 301. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
38 (2009) (citing Christopher Whalen). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; see also CFTC, Policy Statement 
Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 21, 1989); Partnoy, 
Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 435–36 (describing the Policy Statement). 
 304. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 436; see CFTC, supra note 
303, at 30,696–97. 
 305. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 438.  For a detailed analysis, 
see id. at 439–42. 
 306. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590. 
 307. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; see also Futures Trading Practices 
Act, §§ 502(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6), 502(c) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)(A)). 
 308. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,581 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19–20; PARTNOY, 
INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 147; Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 
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exemption “did not provide nearly the certainty it could have.”309  In 
particular, the exempted “swap agreements” did not expressly include 
credit default swaps,310 and given that CDSs are financially not swaps at 
all, there is no reason to presuppose that they would have been covered 
by the exemption. 
4. Managing the Image: Derivatives Scandals 
Ironically, the granting of some “legal certainty” to OTC swaps 
was almost immediately followed by a series of major losses and 
scandals involving OTC derivatives.311  While these events are open to a 
range of interpretations,312 they certainly caused a political backlash, 
which had already been brewing for some time. 313   A year earlier, 
Representative Jim Leach had begun “asking some uncomfortable 
questions of Mark Brickell and the ISDA lobby.”314  This led to the 
publication, by House Banking Committee staff, of a 900-page report on 
derivatives in November 1993, condemning the unregulated market.315  
When the crisis hit the market in 1994, new debates were fuelled, as the 
Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) produced a report highly 
critical of the lack of derivatives regulation,316 and Leach introduced a 
derivatives bill based on his staff report.317 
                                                                                                                                         
53, at 436–37 (describing it and pointing out it “was described as [Wendy] Gramm’s 
‘farewell gift’ to the swaps industry.”). 
 309. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 437. 
 310. See id. (describing the exemption). 
 311. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20 (“Just as a nineteenth century 
judge might have predicted, the near-immediate result was a series of swapsfueled 
speculative disasters.”); PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 112–38 
(describing the events leading to the derivatives scandals of 1994); FCIC Report, supra 
note 1, at 46–47 (discussing swaps scandals after 1993). 
 312. See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 226–27 (presenting a pro-dealer view of some 
of the cases). 
 313. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 147 (describing growing 
skepticism already in 1992, including a Congress request to the Government 
Accounting Office to consider the necessity of regulating derivatives). 
 314. Id.  Partnoy speculates that one possible reason for Leach’s activism was he 
“did not receive financial support from Wall Street and members of the ISDA.” Id. at 
147–48. 
 315. Id. at 148. 
 316. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994), available 
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ISDA’s response was highly effective. 318   Among other things, 
ISDA skillfully influenced the media, persuading journalists to use the 
word “securities” instead of “derivatives” when reporting derivatives 
scandals.319  Brickell also attacked Leach in the media for resorting to 
“serious misstatements of fact”,320 claiming for example that Leach’s 
bill would impose a suitability standard “not applied to any other area of 
finance”, when in fact it was similar to the already-existing suitability 
standards in other areas.321  He also “complained about the Leach bill’s 
supposed capital standards for swaps, when in fact the bill contained no 
such provisions.”322 
ISDA was not fighting alone, as it was backed up by high-profile 
figures including Gerald Corrigan (former head of New York Fed, then 
at Goldman Sachs) and Wendy Gramm (former CFTC chair, then board 
member at Enron). 323   In the end, the public lost interest in these 
complicated issues, and all the legislative initiatives died down; the 
result was a surprise even to industry members, according to the 
Institutional Investor magazine, which “gave the credit to ISDA”.324 
                                                                                                                                         
at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151647.pdf; PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 
261, at 150 (describing the report). 
 317. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 152.  There were also 
three other bills. See, e.g., TETT, supra note 301, at 38. 
 318. According to TETT, “behind the scenes, Brickell and other ISDA officials 
furiously leapt into lobbying action, determined to block the bills before Congress.  
Brickell paid a frenetic series of visits to Republican and Democratic congressmen.  He 
also relentlessly called journalists, trying to persuade them to stop writing about 
derivatives in such a negative light.  He then met regulators around the world, 
preaching the gospel that the industry was capable of cleaning up its act on its own.” 
TETT, supra note 301, at 38. 
 319. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 151 (providing examples and 
citations from personal correspondence between ISDA and Byron E. Calame, then-
deputy managing editor of the Wall Street Journal). 
 320. Id. at 152 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. According to Partnoy, on July 12, 1994, at hearing on the bill, Leach “lost 
his patience with Brickell . . ., accusing him of lying about provisions of the derivatives 
bill.” Id. (citing Lynn Stevens Hume, Regulators, Industry Give Differing Views on 
Bill; Leach Blasts Bank Official for Misstating Provisions, THE BOND BUYER, at 6 
(1994)). 
 323. Id. at 153–54. 
 324. Id. at 154 (citing Michael Peltz, Congress’s Lame Assault on Derivatives, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, at 65 (1994)); see also TETT, supra note 301, at 39–40 
(describing ISDA’s victory). 
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Another publicity challenge came in 1998, when the massive hedge 
fund Long Term Capital Management nearly collapsed, threatening the 
stability of the entire banking sector and leading to an almost-$4 billion 
bailout.325  Only weeks before, the CFTC—now headed by derivatives-
critical Brooksley Born—had suggested it would reconsider OTC 
derivatives regulation.326  However, having learned from the previous 
crisis, the derivatives industry was well prepared and “besieged 
Congress with appeals to stop any federal regulatory effort.”327  Now the 
industry was strongly represented in key government organizations, 
which reacted the very same day of CFTC’s pronouncements to prevent 
any changes to the rule-book.328  In fact, new laws were enacted, this 
time only limiting the powers of CFTC to determine OTC derivatives 
rules.329 
5. The Silent Revolution: Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
If the 1990s derivatives debacles did not lead to re-regulation, they 
made the banking lobby increasingly aware of the precarious status of 
OTC derivatives.  Therefore, in 1999, a Presidential Working Group of 
high-profile figures in the administration with close ties to the 
investment banking lobby was formed in order to “modernize” 
derivatives regulation.330   The Working Group complained about the 
                                                                                                                                         
 325. See FCIC Report, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the LTCM case); Stout, Legal 
Origin, supra note 242, at 20. 
 326. See CFTC, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Concept Release (May 7, 1998), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm; Scott & Biggins, supra 
note 259, at 319; Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20 (noting that “[t]his was a 
dramatic shift in policy, as it implied OTC derivatives might be treated as illegal off-
exchange futures.”) 
 327. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20. 
 328. See U.S. Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx; Scott & 
Biggins, supra note 259, at 319 (describing the backlash). 
 329. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21; see also Stout, Speculators, supra 
note 241, at 768. 
 330. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21; see PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON 
FIN. MRKS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY 
EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter PWG REPORT], available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf. 
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“cloud of legal uncertainty [that] has hung over the OTC derivatives 
markets in the United States in recent years . . . [and] could discourage 
innovation and growth of these important markets.”331  Instead of re-
examining the need to regulate OTC derivatives, the objective was to 
guarantee the enforceability of off-exchange derivatives.332 
This was duly accomplished the following year with the passage of 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which drastically 
expanded the scope of deregulated derivatives markets.333  As a piece of 
legislation, it is “long, complex, technical, and difficult to understand,” 
which may explain why its “passage went relatively unnoticed and 
unremarked by anyone outside the derivatives industry.” 334   Yet its 
significance can hardly be overstated: according to Hazen, “[t]he 
increased regulation of the securities markets in the wake of the late 
1990’s corporate governance scandals […] stands in sharp contrast to 
the massive deregulation of the commodities and non-securities 
derivatives markets that was ushered in by the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act”.335  Moreover, it has been claimed that ISDA was 
heavily involved in the drafting process.336 
The CFMA had at least two important consequences.  One, it 
“restricted the capacity of the SEC and CFTC to directly intervene in 
OTC trading between sophisticated market participants.”337  In terms of 
the CFTC and the CEA, the CFMA exempted OTC derivatives made 
between eligible contract participants and subject to individual 
negotiation.338  With respect to the SEC, the CFMA ensured that the 
notion of “securities” would not include any “security-based swap 
agreement.”339  It also reduced the powers of the SEC to investigate 
                                                                                                                                         
 331. PWG REPORT, supra note 330, at 1. 
 332. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21. 
 333. For a detailed overview of the CFMA, see, for example, JOHNSON & HAZEN, 
supra note 255, § 1.18; Hazen, supra note 87, at 388–95. 
 334. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21. 
 335. Hazen, supra note 87, at 382. 
 336. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 295. 
 337. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 320. 
 338. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21 (citing CFMA §§ 103, 120 (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(h), 25(a)(4) (2012)); Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 986; Wynkoop, supra 
note 55, at 3100. 
 339. See CFMA § 302(a), § 303(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1, § 78c-1 (2012)); 
Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984.  A “security-based swap agreement” is a swap “of 
which a material term is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security . . . 
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fraud, manipulation or insider trading in security-based swap 
agreements.340 
Secondly, the CFMA expanded the notion of swap agreements, 
explicitly mentioning credit default swaps.341  The CFMA definition of 
swap agreements is complex, but what makes it interesting is that it 
departs radically from standard financial definitions of swaps: instead of 
referring to an exchange of cash-flows, it extends swaps to an agreement 
that “transfers . . . the financial risk associated with a future change in 
any . . . value or level [of securities or other financial or economic 
interests] known as . . . credit default swap.”342  The text is paradoxical, 
because it defines CDSs in terms of a pure risk transfer, but simply calls 
them swaps.  This suggests that the drafters were aware of the awkward 
status of CDSs as swaps, but they were determined to exploit the fact 
that OTC swaps had become the least regulated legal category, and few 
people outside the industry understood them anyway. 
Another paradox of the CFMA is that its official objectives 
included “reduc[ing] systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty.”343  The 
apparent justification for this claim was that the uncertain enforceability 
of OTC derivatives might cause disruptions. 344   This reasoning was 
optimistic in retrospect, as the passage of CFMA was followed by a 
spectacular growth of OTC derivatives trading—especially of a 
speculative nature—as anyone could have predicted.345  Stout has gone 
so far as to argue that “the [2008] credit crisis was not primarily due to 
‘innovations’ in the markets or the legal system’s failure to ‘keep pace’ 
with finance.  The crisis was caused, first and foremost, by changes in 
the law.”346 
C. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE PARADOXICAL DODD-FRANK 
                                                                                                                                         
.,” so that it is not regulated as a security. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 985; 15 
U.S.C. § 78c note (2012). 
 340. Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 985. 
 341. See id. at 984–85 (discussing the definition of “swap agreement” in CFMA). 
 342. 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2012). 
 343. CFMA § 2(6); see also PWG REPORT, supra note 330, at 6 (noting the same 
objective). 
 344. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 22. 
 345. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 22–29 (describing the 
developments); Stout, Speculators, supra note 241, at 772–73 (arguing, in 1999, that 
enabling speculation would increase systemic risks). 
 346. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 3. 
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ACT 
The lack of regulation was challenged at least temporarily by the 
global financial crisis, and in addition to the steps taken by state 
insurance regulators, bills were introduced at federal level to prohibit 
uncovered CDSs or all CDS trading.347  But the industry, led by ISDA, 
fought back.348  At first it denied any problems, but soon a cooperative 
mode was adopted that would prove to be highly effective.349  Although 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 takes a step in the direction of more 
regulation, a closer look reveals a mixed picture with respect to OTC 
derivatives.350 
1. New Restrictions 
For CDSs, the Dodd-Frank Act increases regulation at least in four 
ways.  Firstly, it abolishes the CFMA prohibition of regulating OTC 
derivatives by affirming the jurisdiction of CFTC over “swaps” and SEC 
over “security-based swaps”.351  Secondly, it subjects “security-based 
                                                                                                                                         
 347. Respectively, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 355(h) (2009) and H.R. 3145, 111th 
Cong. § 4 (2009); see Shadab, supra note 4, 425 (describing federal bills).  Even the 
Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 (H.R. 977) initially 
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2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
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 348. Christopher Arup, The Global Financial Crisis: Learning From Regulatory 
and Governance Studies, 32 L. & POL. 363, 371 (2010). 
 349. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON AGRIC., SER. NO. 111–1, HEARING 
TO REVIEW DERIVATIVES LEGISLATION 165 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg51698/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg51698.pdf 
(showing Senator James C. Marshall, GA, getting impatient with ISDA’s Robert Pickel 
for “just stonewalling” and suggesting “that the industry start considering compromises 
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 350. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap 
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 234–42 (2011) (critically discussing the Dodd-
Frank Act’s approach to CDSs); Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 31–36 
(likewise, with respect to OTC derivatives generally). 
 351. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 722(a)–(b), 762(a); see Bloink, supra note 215, at 607–08; 
Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, An Altered Derivatives Marketplace: Clearing Swaps Under 
Dodd-Frank, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 189, 208–09 (2012). 
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swap dealers” and “major security-based swap participants” to SEC 
registration. 352   Thirdly, it prohibits federal bailouts of “swaps 
entities”.353  Fourth, it imposes a clearing requirement for speculative 
swaps.354 
There are, however, several reasons why the outcome is far from 
onerous.  For one thing, SEC and CFTC jurisdiction is limited to what is 
expressly admitted.355  Similarly, the bailout prohibition—known as the 
“swap pushout rule”356—is watered down in various ways: it does not 
apply to insured depository institutions,357 and does not prevent them 
from establishing affiliates that function as swaps entities.358  Thus it has 
been estimated that the “exceptions to the general prohibition threaten to 
swallow the rule, and the exposure of many financial institutions to CDS 
risk will continue.”359 
2. Mandatory Clearing and Its Limits 
The principal solution offered by Dodd-Frank for the problems of 
OTC derivatives is the imposition of a mandatory central counterparty 
clearing requirement for many of these transactions.360  The principle is 
the same as in the old Commodity Exchange Act, which required “that 
speculative commodity futures be traded only on organized 
exchanges.”361  The objective is to promote transparency and reduce 
counterparty risks.362 
                                                                                                                                         
 352. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 731, 764; see also Cadmus, supra note 351, at 213; 
Bloink, supra note 215, at 609–10.  On the definition of swap dealers and major swap 
participants, see Cadmus, supra note 351, at 210. 
 353. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716; see Bloink, supra note 215, at 610–12. 
 354. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a)(2), 763(a); see Bloink, supra note 215, at 608–09; 
Cadmus, supra note 351, at 213–14. 
 355. Dodd-Frank Act, § 712(b). 
 356. Annette L. Nazareth, Dodd-Frank Act Finalizes Swap Pushout Rule, HARV. L. 
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/dodd-frank-act-finalizes-swap-
pushout-rule. 
 357. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716(b)(2)(B). 
 358. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716(c). 
 359. Bloink, supra note 215, at 611. 
 360. Dodd-Frank Act, § 723(a)(2) (swaps); § 763(a) (security-based swaps). 
 361. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 34. 
 362. Johnson, supra note 350, at 234–38. On the details, see also Cadmus, supra 
note 351, at 219; Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 34. 
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The question is how much will be achieved.  The first concern 
relates to the exceptions to the clearing requirement.  One of them 
applies when swaps are used by a non-financial entity “to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk.”363  Other transactions may also be exempted 
from clearing, because this is ultimately subject to SEC and CFTC 
determinations. 364   Some commentators have been worried that the 
regulators might yield to the enormous pressure of the financial 
industry. 365   This concern is especially pertinent in relation to 
customized CDSs, which cannot be cleared so easily. 
In fact, several commentators claim that there is an automatic 
exemption for non-standardized CDSs and other derivatives that 
clearinghouses will not accept for clearing.366  The legal basis of this 
affirmation is not entirely clear.367  But if non-standardized transactions 
are exempted, there is an enormous regulatory loophole.368  To be sure, 
even non-cleared swaps must be reported to a registered swap data 
                                                                                                                                         
 363. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a), 763(a); see also Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 
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 364. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a) (CFTC), 763(a) (SEC); Bloink, supra note 215, at 
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 367. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a) amends § 2(h)(3)(C) of the Commodity Exchange 
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consider, including trading liquidity. See id.  Therefore, there is a legal basis for 
exempting some contracts from the mandatory clearing requirement, but it is not an 
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 368. Frank Partnoy, Danger in Wall Street’s Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009); 
Johnson, supra note 350, at 241. 
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repository,369 and SEC and CFTC have powers to investigate “abusive 
swaps”, i.e. transactions seen to be “detrimental to . . . the stability of a 
financial market . . .  or . . .  participants in financial markets.”370 If 
CDSs continue to be widely used by hedge funds and investment banks, 
these powers of investigation should be exercised. 
The second concern is that “the clearinghouse requirement might 
inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses 
themselves.”371  According to one expert, “it is plausible that central 
clearing would raise systemic risks greatly when another crisis occurred 
and perhaps even raise the likelihood of a crisis.”372  While it is true that 
clearinghouses have rarely failed, one should not rely too much on 
history. 373   Recent decades have witnessed several clearinghouse 
failures, and there is a danger that complex OTC derivatives would 
create substantial difficulties, especially if clearinghouses are forced to 
accept them. 374   It has also been argued that the current resolution 
system is highly vulnerable to systemic risk in derivatives 
clearinghouses.375 
3. Preemption of Insurance Regulation 
For the present Article, one of the key aspects of Dodd-Frank is 
that the derivatives industry obtained an exclusion of insurance 
regulation.376  This was a surprise, because the original draft did not 
address the question of CDSs and insurance, and in fact sought to 
                                                                                                                                         
 369. Dodd Frank Act, §§ 727, 729, 766; Bloink, supra note 215, at 608; Cadmus, 
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impose an insurable interest rule on uncovered CDSs.377  The banking 
lobby was able not only to block this but also to obtain an express 
exclusion of insurance law, which was added to the final version of the 
law seemingly without careful examination. 378   Thus Section 722 
(amending the Commodity Exchange Act) states laconically: “A swap—
(1) shall not be considered to be insurance; and (2) may not be regulated 
as an insurance contract under the law of any State.” 379   Similarly, 
Section 767 adds (amending the Securities Exchange Act): “A security-
based swap may not be regulated as an insurance contract under any 
provision of State law.”380 
One might question the applicability of these exclusions to CDSs, 
given that it is difficult to see how CDSs could be functionally labeled 
swaps.381  Therefore the definition of “swaps” in Section 721 has been 
rendered so broad that it is almost another label for any derivative.382  It 
also expressly includes a “transaction commonly known as . . . a credit 
default swap”.383 
As an ironic consequence of this anti-functionalist approach to 
classifying financial products, concerns have subsequently been raised 
that the new rules are creating legal uncertainty to insurers, because such 
contracts as financial guaranty insurance might come under the 
regulation of swaps (which insurers are not permitted to trade).384  This 
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 378. See Letter from Robert Damron, President, and Joseph Morelle, Chairman of 
the Fin. Services & Inv. Products Comm.Committee, Nat’l Conference of Ins. 
Legislators, to Barney Frank, Chairman of the U.S. House-Senate Financial Reform 
Conference Comm.Committee (June 15, 2010) (available at 
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2010/07152010615CDSLetter.pdf.). 
 379. Dodd-Frank Act, § 722.  
 380. Dodd-Frank Act, § 767.  This statement is strangely found under the heading 
“State Gaming and Bucket Shop Laws,”suggesting that it was added late in the drafting 
process. 
 381. See supra Part II.D.3. 
 382. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 33; see Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21); 
Cadmus, supra note 351, at 209–10 (explaining the definition). The amended 
definitions merely exclude some derivatives as non-swaps. 
 383. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21).  For our purposes, the definition of “security-
based swap agreements” in the Securities Exchange Act refers back to this revised 
definition of swaps: see Dodd-Frank Act § 761(a)(6). 
 384. See Houman B. Shadab, Doesn’t Anyone Want to Be a Swap Anymore? (Nov. 
1, 2011), http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/11/doesnt-anyone-want-to-be-a-
swap-anymore.html (describing insurance industry concerns). 
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absurdity is the logical consequence of artificially creating different 
regulatory regimes for transactions that have exactly the same content,385 
and legal uncertainty can only be avoided by giving strict primacy to 
form over substance, in contradiction with insurance law tradition.386 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has clarified our legal understanding of CDSs in two 
principal ways: firstly, in relation to insurance, showing how the 
principles of insurance law are correctly applied to CDSs, and secondly, 
in relation to derivatives, explaining how the deregulated space for OTC 
derivatives was created, consolidated, and expanded to include CDSs. 
In relation to insurance law, this Article has firstly pointed out that, 
contrary to an oft-repeated belief, New York Insurance Law did not 
define CDSs as non-insurance transactions.387  It has then explained why 
the no-intention-to-insure argument is defective both in law and in 
fact, 388  also demonstrating that “credit default swaps” are not 
structurally and economically swaps at all.389  It has also cleared up 
confusion regarding the notions of insurable interest and loss indemnity, 
proposing how they should be applied to CDSs.390 
In order to explain the derivatives-characterization of CDSs, the 
Article has argued that the financial sector has skillfully exploited the 
increasingly disparate treatment of functionally similar transactions.391  
On one hand, the restrictive regime of insurance regulation was avoided 
in subtle ways such as by promoting a private legal opinion (the Potts 
opinion) to this effect,392 obtaining favorable responses from regulators 
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to narrowly formulated questions,393 and proposing novel definitions or 
demarcation criteria of insurance.394  On the other hand, the banking 
lobby introduced the novel concept of swap, which was first used to 
exploit regulatory exemptions,395  and later extended to an increasing 
range of transactions, including CDSs.396 
The arguments presented here imply several questions for scholars 
and policymakers.  In terms of legal doctrine, the present situation is 
uncomfortable, as the arguments for the derivatives-based view are 
based on a misinterpretation of insurance law principles, 397  and 
buttressed by a misreading of legislation.398  As it moreover remains 
unclear on what basis CDSs can be meaningfully described as swaps,399 
this raises the question of whether this terminology was but a trick for 
avoiding regulation.  In consequence, functionally identical transactions 
may now be insurance, derivatives, or even both.400  In the U.S., the 
confusion is only exacerbated by Dodd-Frank Act’s preemption of 
insurance law, which is coupled with an all-encompassing notion of 
swaps that extends this deregulated category to CDSs on a purely 
formalistic basis.401  There is no synthesis or compromise between the 
different views, which merely seem to co-exist side by side, at best 
agreeing to disagree. 
In terms of financial regulation, the recent reforms are a modest 
step forward—but very modest indeed, as they are also filled with 
problems: Firstly, the Dodd-Frank compulsory clearing rule is likely to 
apply only to some CDSs, leaving others unregulated.402   Secondly, 
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there are serious worries regarding the concentration of systemic risks in 
derivatives clearinghouses, which may sow the seeds of a new crisis.403  
Thirdly, many concerns associated with CDSs remain largely 
unaddressed. 404   Thus there is an urgent need for continued critical 
investigation on the real costs and benefits of CDSs and their regulatory 
options. 
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